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1. Child  Porn ogra ph y Pr even tion  Act  of 19 95: H eari ng s on  S . 123 7 B efore t he
Senate Comm . on the Jud iciary, 104th Cong. 14 (199 6) [hereinafter CPPA of 1995]
( st a t ement  of Kevin V. Di Gregory, Deputy Assistant A tt o rney General,  U.S.
Depar tmen t of J us ti ce).
2. S ee Ch ild Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act and Pornograph y
Victims  Protection Act of 1987: Hearing on S. 703 and  S. 2033 Before t h e Senate
Com m . on the Ju diciary, 100 th Cong. 1 (1990) (stat emen t of Hon. Den nis De Concini,
U.S. Sen a tor , Ar iz on a) (“C h ild pornography ha s become a highly organized,
mu ltim illion-dollar  industr y preying on the youth  of our country wh o are either
un able  to protect themse l ve s  or  are indu ced into participating by those who th ey
tr ust .”).
3. S ee CPPA of 1995, supra note 1, at 22-23 (statement  of Jeffrey J. Dupilka ,
Depu ty Chief Postal Inspector for Criminal Investigat ions , U. S. P ost al I ns pect ion
Se rv ice).
4. Pedophiles and child molesters u se child pornograph y in severa l ways: (1)
t o sexua lly a rou se t he ms elve s, w hich  us ua lly le ad s ei th er  to m as tu rb at ion or  to t he
sexua l ab us e of ch ildr en ; (2) t o lowe r t he  in hi bit ion s of ch ildren  by making t hem
th ink th is is nor ma l; (3) to ins tr uct ch ildren  on how to perform specific sexual acts;
(4) to bar ter , tr ade or  sell in  order to obtain other  sexually explicit images of children
or  inform at ion on h ow to obta in t hem ; (5) to thr eat en ch ildre n in to silen ce. See CPPA
of 1995, supra  note 1, at  89-90 (stat emen t of Bruce A. Taylor, President  and Ch ief
Counsel of The N at iona l Law C ent er for C hildr en a nd F am ilies). 
5. S ee Ef fect of  Porn ogra ph y on  Wom en  a n d Children: Hearing Before the
Subcom m . on  Ju venile Justice of the Senate Comm . on the Jud iciary, 98th Cong. 31
(1985) [hereinafter Ef fect ] (te st im on y of Ke nn et h V.  La nn in g, S pe cia l Age nt , F BI ).
6. Child  por nogr ap hy  follows a  cycle. Fir st, t he a dult  tr ies to ed ucat e th e child
abou t  sexua l  acts  by showin g th e child exa mples  of pornogra phy. Th en, t he pe dophile
exp la ins to the ch i ld  t h a t  t h is is accept ed an d nor ma l beha vior. Next , th e pedoph ile
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Shift ing the  Paradigm in  Child  Pornography
Cr im in a liza t ion : Un ited S tates v. Maxw ell
I. IN T R O D U C T I O N
 “It  is difficult to imagin e a  more r epulsive an d cruel  act ,
bot h  to the individual involved and to our  Na t ion , t han  ensna r -
ing a young person in child  porn ogra ph y. It r obs th e child of his
or  h er in nocen ce an d de ba ses  our  society.”1 Although this is a
s t rong st at em en t, it  accur at ely des cribes  th e per nicious  pla gue
tha t  child  por nogr aph y h as b ecom e. C hild  por nography is a
lucrat ive,2 underground3 business in which people profit by
exploitin g childr en . Fu rt her mor e, only ped ophiles  an d child
moles t er s consume ch i ld  pornography ,4 since no other m ar ket
exist s for such images.5 F ina lly,  ch i ld  pornography  unfor tu -
na te ly enge nd er s t he  crea tion  of more ch ild por nogr ap hy. 6
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uses  chil d por nogr ap hy  to con v in c e t he child that oth er children en joy such activities
with  adu lts or  peer s. Child p ornogr aph y is contin ua lly u sed  to low er  th e in hib iti ons
of th e child. Eve nt ua lly, the p edop hil e a nd  chil d pe rfor m s exu al a cts  toge th er  in s ome
of th e encoun ter s. Fin ally, sexu a l  en c ou n te rs  wit h t he  chil d a re  ph otogr ap he d or
videoed. The key is that child pornography creates child po r n ogra phy. S ee SH I R LE Y
O’BR I E N, CH I L D  P O R N OG R AP H Y 89-90 (1983), reprinted in CPPA of 1995, supra  no t e
1, at 103-04. For a specific case exam ple see Ef fect,  supra  n ote  5, a t 3 3 (te st im ony
of Kenn et h V.  La nn in g).
7. Amazin gly, two organizations publicly support sexual experimen ta tion for
children: t h e  N or t h American Man -Boy Love Association (NAMBLA) and the Ren e
Gu yon  Socie ty . Bot h g rou ps  ad voca te  th e s exu al  libe ra ti on of con se nt in g ch i ld r e n  over
four  year s of age. Specifically, th e Rene  Guyon s ociety’s mot to is “Sex by yea r  e igh t
or  else i t ’s  t oo late .” Effect, supra note  5, at  72. For a  more  complete  view of their
ideologies, see i d . at 72-89.
8. S ee CPPA of 1995, supra note 1, at  1-3 (stat emen t of Hon. Orr in  G. H at ch ,
U.S. Sen at or, Ut ah ). 
9. S ee d iscuss ion  infra  Par t II.B; see also infra note 44 and a ccompan ying text
(listing  th e m aj or  chi ld p or no gr ap hy  st at ut es  pa ss ed  by C on gr es s s in ce 1 978 ).
10. Pub.  L. No. 104-208, 110 St at . 3009-26 to 3009-31 (1996). This s ta tu te
created  a n ew section  of the Code, 18 U .S.C. § 2252A, specifically ta r geting computer
generat ed child porn ograp hy.
11. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “actus r eu s” a s “[t ]he  ‘guilt y a ct. ’ A wr on gfu l
deed which r ende rs t he a ctor crim ina lly liable  if combin ed wit h m ens  rea .” BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 36 (6t h e d. 19 90); see also Uni t e d S t a tes v. Bailey, 585 F.2d 1087,
1118 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (defining actus r eus as “the p hysical elemen t of t he  cri me ”),
rev’d , 444 U.S. 394 (1980); United States v. Bishop, 469 F .2d  1337,  1348  (1s t  Ci r .
1972) (definin g actu s re us a s “any gu ilty a ct”). 
12. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “mens  rea” as  “an  e lement  of  cr imina l
res ponsibilit y: a guilty mind; a guilty or wrongful purpose; a crimina l intent .” Id . a t
985; see also Mor iss et te  v. U ni te d S ta te s, 3 42 U .S.  246 , 25 2 (19 52) (“ ‘[M]en s  r e a ’ [is
used] to s ign ify a n e vil p ur pos e or  me nt al  cul pa bil it y.”).
To the vast ma jority of Americans, child pornography is a
noxiou s evil.7 This  view ha s bipa rt isa n s up port  am ong legisla -
tor s wh o cont in ua lly  t igh ten  child  por nogr aph y la ws  in  an  effor t
to eradicate th ese ma te ria ls from  society. 8 Ove r  the ye ars,  Con -
gress has  t r ied to s top  both  the  supp ly  and demand  for  s u ch
lu rid ma te ria ls; howe ver , th i s p r ocess h as  been  piecem eal. 9 For
example, th e m ost r ecent  feder al le gisla tion  in t his  ar ea , th e
Child  Pornography P reven t ion  Act  of 1996,10 criminalizes the
computer  p roduct ion  and  a lt er a t ion of child  porn ogra ph y. Al-
though the 1996 Act is a n eeded addition in the fight against
child pornograph y, it  simply redefines the “actus reus”11 ele-
men t of these crim es as p ast  laws h ave done.
In  con t ras t , the  United  S ta tes  Cour t  of Appea l s for  the
Armed Services r ecently decided a case tha t broadened the
“m en s rea ”12 req uir eme nt  in child  porn ogra ph y crime s. Th is
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13. 45 M.J . 40 6 (C. A.A.F . 19 96).
14. Black’s Law Dictionary n ote s t ha t “s cien te r” is  “fre qu en tl y u se d t o sig ni fy
t h e defendan t’s guilty k nowled ge.” BLACK’S  LAW DICTIONARY 134 5 (6t h e d. 1 990 ).
However , this Note will use the term s “mens  r ea , ” “sci en te r ,” “men ta l e lemen t ,” and
“menta l culpability” intercha ngeably as ma ny court opinions and law r eviews articles
ha ve done. S ee, e.g., Unit ed Sta tes v. X-Citeme nt Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 70-72
(199 4); Moskal v. Unite d Sta tes, 498 U.S. 103, 109 (1990); Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S.
103, 115 (1990); Colau tt i v. Fr an klin , 439 U.S . 379, 401 (1979 ); Morisset te v. U n i t ed
States,  342 U.S. 246, 250-63 (1952); Christ ina  Ega n, Lev el of S cient er R equ ired  for
Child  Pornography Distributors: Su preme Court’s Interpretation of “Knowin gly” in 18
U.S .C. § 2252, 86 J.  CRIM . L. & CR I M IN O L O G Y 1341, 1355-56 (1996); Jeffrey P . Kapla n
and Georgia  M. Gre en, Gramm ar and Inferences of Rationality in Int erpreting the
Child  Pornography Statute, 73 WA S H . U. L.Q. 1223, 1228-34 (1995); Pat ricia A. Burke,
Note, Uni ted  S ta tes v. X-Cite me nt  Vide o, In c.: Stretching the Limits of S tatutory
In terpre ta t ion?, 56 LA. L. RE V. 937  (199 6).
15. This  Not e wil l focus  on 1 8 U.S.C. § 2252 since this section punishes the
thr ee most  typical ch ild porn ograp hy crim es: dis t ri bu tion , re ceipt , an d pos ses sion .
Other  pr ovis ion s a re  wor th y of n ote . Se cti on s 2 251  to 2 252 A and 2260 criminalize the
p roduct ion , distr ibu tion, poss ession, a dvert ising a nd im port at ion of child porn ograp hy.
Sect ions 2253-55  and 2259 ou t li ne the crimin al and civil remedies the governm ent
and vict im s h ave . Se ction  2256  defin es t he  opera tive  te rm s of Ch ap te r 1 10. S ect ion
2257 outlines the record-keeping requirements t h a t  a ll adult pornograph y producers
must  follow in order t o  sh ow th at  no min ors wer e involved in  ma king t heir
porn ograp hic me rch an dis e. F ina lly, s ect ion 2 258 l ays  out  the  crim ina l lia bilit y for
failur e to report child abuse, of which child pornography is considered one fo rm .   S ee
18 U. S.C . §§ 22 51-2 252 , 22 53-2 260  (199 4); 18  U. S.C .A. § 2 252 A (West 1985, Supp.
199 7).
16. When  pros ecut ing in dividu als for  child por nogr aph y violat ions, t he
government  will usually focus on images  cont ai ni ng  pr epu bes cen t ch ildr en  sin ce it will
be easier to convince a jury tha t th e accused individual “knew” the performer s were
case, United S tates v. Maxwell,13 sh ifted or  enla rged the  “mens
rea” or  “sci en te r”14 ele men t  of child  por nogr aph y cr im es  con-
ta ined  in 18 U.S.C. § 225215 by adding “belief” as a n a ccepta ble
mens rea st andar d. T h e cu r r e n t  in t e r pr e t a t ion  of t h is sec-
t ion —to be discussed  in m ore de ta il lat er in  th is Note—requir es
a  defendan t  t o have “kn owledge” th at  at  least  one of th e per-
form ers  in volve d in  se xu a lly  exp lici t  condu ct  is  a  min or  before
being crimina lly liable.
By focusing on  the m en s r ea  ele men t  of child por nography
stat utes, Congress’ inten t t o erad ica t e child por nogra ph y is
bett er  rea lized. The cur ren t int erp r e tat ion of 18 U.S.C. § 2252
requ ires  th e gover nm ent t o prove tha t a n individua l “knew” he
d is t r ibu ted, r eceived or possessed child porn ograph y. Except
when  ima ges dep ict a  pr epu bescen t ch ild in s exua lly explicit
cond u ct , the government h as an a lmost insur mountable obsta-
cle in proving th at  th e accused individua l had  “kn owledge”
regard ing the  pe r form e r s’ minority status.16 For  example , com-
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minors. Wh en  pu bes cen t or  ad oles cen t m inor s are de picted in  sexua lly explicit
cond uct , the government has a  ha rder  tim e both  proving t he pe rform ers ’ min ority a nd
the accused’s knowledge of such. Usua lly, the governm ent will ha ve to  ca l l a  medica l
expe r t to  t es t i fy  tha t  ce r ta in ph ysiological traits of the performer, like hips or breasts,
a r e th ose of a te ena ger d ue t o th eir d evelopm ent . S ee Inte rview with Ro ger Youn g,
Specia l Age n t  for the Fe dera l Burea u of Investigat ion, in Las Vegas, Nev. (Ju ne 3,
199 7).
17. S ee CPPA of 1995, supra  no te  1, a t 2 1 (s ta te me nt  of J effr ey J . Dupi lka ,
Depu ty Chief Post al In spector  for Crim ina l Inves tigat ions, U.S . Post al In spection
Se rv ice).
18. Sin ce the  who le  t ext  of § 2252 is t oo long  to q uot e, t his  Not e wil l qu ote
re levan t  part s thr oughout th e paper wh en  requ ired . See infra notes 19, 79, and  102.
Sin ce many  of  the  subsect ions in 18 U.S.C. § 2252A follow the str uctur e of § 2252,
§ 2252 A can  als o be u sed . Also, b eca us e § 2252A deals wit h compu ter -gener at ed child
porn ograp hy,  the n eed  for  a recklessness m ens rea  stan dard is evident, a s one may
never  “know” if an actual child is used in the pr oduction of the image due t o
morph ing an d gra phic soft war e. S ee CPPA of 1995, supra not e 1, a t 2 4 (st at em en t of
J effr ey  J . Dupi lk a , D ep u ty C hie f P os ta l I nspe ct or , U .S . P os ta l I nspe ct ion  Ser vi ce ).  “A
simp le example of this would be a visua l dep ict ion  in  wh ich  a p ict ur e of a n a ctu al
child’s hea d is joined wit h a  pictur e of an a dult ’s bod y to crea te a  new p ictur e in
wh ich  the  ch i ld  is  dep ic t ed  a s  engaged  in  sexua l condu ct.” Id. at  17 (st at em en t of
Kevin  V. Di Gregor y, Depu ty Assis ta nt  Attor ney G ene ra l). 
19. “ ‘[S]exually  exp licit  cond uct ’” is defined as “actu al or s imu lat ed—(A) sexua l
intercourse,  includ ing  gen i ta l-gen i ta l, ora l-genital, an al-genital, or oral-anal, whether
between  persons of the sam e or opposite sex; (B) best i a li t y; (C) mas tur bation; (D)
sad istic or mas ochistic abuse; or  (E) lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area
of an y pe rs on .” 18 U .S. C. § 2 256 (2) (19 94).
20. Bot h  18 U .S. C. § 2 252 (a)(1 )(A) an d (a )(2)(A) u se  the ph rase  “the  p roducing
of such  visua l depiction in volves th e use  of a minor  enga ging in sexua lly explicit
cond uct ” to enum erat e the r equired elem ents  of the crime. This N ote will  u se  the
phra ses “minorit y eleme nt ” or “use of a m inor ele men t” to refer  to th e lan gua ge in
put er  software  can morph and a l ter  images so as  to make it
seem a  child  is  en ga gin g in  se xu a lly  exp lici t  condu ct  wh en  one
is not ,17 ma king it a lmost imp ossible for th e govern men t t o
p rove an individual  knew a  min or  wa s involve d.  Th is  bu rde n  of
prov ing “knowledge” means tha t  much  child pornograph y de-
pictin g adolescen t  or  pubescen t m i n ors goes unprosecuted.
United S tates v. Maxwell is sign ifica n t  because it  tak es a
differen t  approach—re laxing the  cu r re n t  m ens rea st andar d of
kn owledge to a less dem an ding one.
In  ligh t  of United S tates v. Maxwell, th is N ote will a rgu e
tha t  for  18  U.S.C. § 22521 8  t o effectively det er  th is r epu lsive
conduct , a m ore relaxed  m e ns rea  sta nda rd of “belief” or
“recklessness” is bot h t he oret ically jus tified  by pu blic policy an d
cons t itu t iona l if prope rly lim ite d. Alth ough  18 U.S.C. § 2252
requ ires t ha t (1) ther e be a m inor an d (2) th e minor be en gaged
in  se xu a lly  exp lici t  condu ct 19 before cr imina l liability is found,20
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th is s ect ion .
21. S ee Chaplinsk y v. Ne w H am ps hi re , 31 5 U .S.  568 , 57 1-72  (194 2) (“There a re
certa in  well-defined a nd n ar rowly limit ed classes of spe ech , th e pr eve nt ion a nd
pun ishmen t of whi ch h ave  ne ver  bee n t hou gh t t o raise any Constitu tional problem.
These include  th e lewd a nd obscen e, th e profan e, th e libelou s, a nd  th e in su lti ng  or
‘fightin g’ wor ds  . . . . ” (footn ote  om it te d)).
22. S ee Abrams  v. United St ates , 250 U.S. 616, 630 (191 9) (H olmes , J .,
dissen tin g) (“[T]he best t est of truth  is the power of the though t to get itself accepted
in  th e com pe ti ti on  of th e m ar ke t .  . . .”).
23. S ee Chapl insky, 315 U.S . at 571 -72; see generally New York v. Ferber , 458
th i s Note will limit  its focus t o the m ens r ea r equirem ent
concern in g the minority status of pornographic performers.
Pa r t  II of this Note will summ a r iz e t he r eleva nt  his tor y an d
in te ract ion  bet wee n obscen it y ju r isprudence a nd  child
pornography ju r ispr ude nce a s w ell  as con gr es siona l a ct ion
ta ken  in child pornograph y legislation. Part  III will discuss
United States v. Maxw ell an d it s r ea sonin g. Pa rt  IV will ar gue
tha t  a m ens r ea st an dar d of “belief” or “r eckless nes s” is
theor et ica lly  ju st ifie d for  the “use of a  minor” e lemen t  of § 2252
and is also constitutional if properly limited.
II. BA CK G R OU N D
This  Par t  wil l show t h e following: (1) tha t obscen ity
ju r i sp rudence and  ch i ld  pornography jur ispr ud ence a re closely
linked  because const itu tion al d octrin es foun d in  obscenit y law
ap ply to ch ild por nogr ap hy la w; an d (2) th at  child p orn ogra ph y
s ta tut e s and  case  law  ha ve dea lt p rim ar ily wit h en lar ging t he
actus reu s, while little focus ha s been  g iven t o men s r ea. Th is
background is vit a l  to an  unders tand ing  of why the men s rea
s t anda rd in  § 2252 sh ould be relaxe d. Th e following Pa rt
sketchs th e key cases  in  bot h  obscenit y jur ispr ud ence a nd  child
pornography jurispr uden ce and t he r elationsh ips between
them.
A. Obscenity and Child Pornography
 The Fir st Amen dmen t gives no one carte blanch e freedom of
speech; in  fact, a few cat egories of speech are a fforded no
pr otection  a t  a l l.21 For  example , while th e Constit ut ion secures
fr ee spee ch in or der  to pr otect t he m ar ket pla ce of ideas,2 2
obscenit y and child pornography have been enumerated a s
a reas ou t s ide th i s protected m ar ket place.23 The following cases
D :\ 1 9 9 8- 2\ F I N A L \ F E A -F I N . W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
840 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1998
U.S. 747 (1982) (holding th e sta te’s compelling  in t eres t in  era dicatin g child
pornography outweighs any possible First Amendm ent right a  defendant  m a y  h a ve).
24. S ee Chapl insky, 315 U.S. at 571-72.
25. In  Roth  v. Un ited S tates, 354 U.S. 476  (1957), the Cou rt  adopt ed its  first
obscen ity st an da rd : “[W]het he r t o th e a ver age  per son , ap plyi ng  cont em por ar y
communi ty s t andards,  th e domin an t t hem e of the m at eria l ta ken  as a  whole a ppea ls
to pru rien t in ter est .” Id . at  489  (foot no te  om it te d).
26. F o r a history of the Court’s struggle on how to define obscenity between
R oth  and Mi ller ,  see  Jus t ice Brennan’s  d is sen t  i n  Par is A du lt T hea tre I  v. S lat on , 413
U.S. 49,  80-8 3 (19 73) (B re nn an , J ., d iss en ti ng ).
27. 413 U. S. 1 5 (19 73).
28. Id . at  24 (citat ions omit ted) (quot ing Roth , 354  U.S . at  489).  Com p a re th is
test  t o  the  one  in  Roth , 354  U .S . a t  489 , and  tho se  m e n t io n ed  in  Brennan’s  d is sen t
in  Par is A du lt T hea tr e I, 413 U.S. at 80-83.
29. Theor etically,  the Miller obscenity d efinition  would pr otect som e child
pornography if it posse ssed  ser ious lit era ry, a rt istic, political, or scientific value. The
s a m e pr ote cti on cou ld b e ex te nd ed i f th e m at er ia l we re  not  te chn ically obs cen e, s in ce
child por no gr ap hy  wa s n o lon ger  pr es um ed  to c on st it ut e d e fa ct o obscenity. The fear
tha t  som e ch ild p orn ogr ap hy  wou ld be  up he ld a s con st itu tion al  under  the Mi ller  test
demons t r a t e th e re lat ionsh ip betw een  obscenit y an d child
pornography in  both  the  product ion /d is t r ibu t ion  and posses sion
ca tegor ies an d sh ow how sim ilar  legal p rin ciples a re a pplied  in
a slight ly different  ma nn er.
1. Producti on  an d  d is tr ibu ti on  under Miller v. Ca lifornia  and
New York  v. Ferber
 Alth ough  th e Su pr em e Cour t s uggested  ear lier  t h a t
obscenity  lacks  F ir s t  Amendment  p rotect ion ,24 not u nt il 1957
did  t he Cour t fir st  at te mp t t o define obs cenit y.25 Dur ing  the
ne xt  th ree  decades, the Court  stru ggled to define obscenity as a
lega l concept and to determine what test sh ould be ap plied
when  distribution and pr oduction of obscenity were involved.26
Fina lly in Miller v. California 27 the  Cour t  a r t i cu la ted a
stan dard for obscenity, which is the current t est:
(a ) wh eth er  “ the a vera ge per son,  ap plying con t e m p or a r y
c om m u n i t y s t an da rd s” wou ld  f ind  th a t  t h e  work ,  t aken  a s  a
who le , appea l s  t o  the  p ru r i en t  i n t e re s t ; (b ) w h e t h er  t h e  w or k
d e p ic t s or  de scr ibe s, in  a  pa te n tl y offe n s i v e w a y , s ex u a l
con d u ct  spe cifically de fin ed  by t h e a pp lica ble  st a te  la w; a n d (c)
whe th e r  t h e  w or k ,  ta k e n  as  a  wh ole,  lacks se r ious l i ter ar y,
a r t i s t i c,  po li t i ca l ,  or  s c i en t i fi c va lue .28
While  th e Miller de cis ion  sol id ifie d t he d efin it ion  of obscen ity,  it
als o spa rk ed a  deba te  on child  porn ogra ph y.29
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pr ompted  Con gr es s t o pa ss  th e fir st  fede ra l ch ild-p orn ogr ap hy  st at ut e: Th e P rot ect ion
of Childr en Again st S exua l E xploita tion  Act of 1977, Pu b. L. No. 95-225 , 92 St at . 7
(197 8).  This original statute defined “minor” as “any person under t he age of sixteen
year s.” Id . at  225 3(c)(1).
The 197 7 Act  cri mi na lize d t he  pr odu cti on  of n onobscene a s well as  obscene child
por n o gr a phy.  Beca us e Con gr ess  fea re d t ha t cr im ina lizin g th e di st ri bu tion  of
n onobscene  child por nogr aph y would n ot be cons tit ut iona l, un der  th e 1977 Act, t he
dis tr ibu tion  of chi ld pornograph y incurr ed crimina l liability only if the m ater ial was
legally  obscene
under  t he M iller  tes t. S ee S. RE P . NO . 95-438, at  17-18 (1977), reprinted in  1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 40, 55.
30. 458 U. S. 7 47 (1 982 ).
31. The Court  gave five pr ima ry r eason s why t h ere  should  be  grea te r  l eeway
in  crimin a lizing chil d por nogr ap hy . Fi rs t, “[i]t  is e vide nt  beyon d t he  ne ed for
ela bor at ion  tha t  a S ta te ’s  in teres t  in  ‘sa feguarding the  phys ica l  and psychological well-
be ing of a min or’ is ‘compellin g.’” I d . at 756 -57 (quoting Globe N ewspa per C o. v.
Su per ior  Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982)). Second, “[t]he distribu tion of ph otographs
and films depictin g sexua l activit y by juven iles is int rin sically re lat ed to t he se xua l
abuse of ch il dr en  . .  . . ” Id . at  759. Thir d, “[t]he a dvert ising a nd sel ling of child
pornography pr ovide  an  econ omi c mot ive for  and a re  thus  an  in t eg ra l pa r t  of  the
pr odu ction  of s uch  mater ia ls , a n  act iv it y i ll eg a l t h rou gh ou t  the N at ion .” Id . at 761.
Four th, “[t]he  val ue  of per mi tt ing  live p er form an ces a nd  ph otogr ap hic r epr odu ction s
of children engaged in lewd sexual conduct is exceedingly modest, if not  de min imis .”
Id . at  762 (emph asis in  origina l). Fifth, “[r]ecognizing an d classifyin g child
pornography as  a ca te gor y of m at er ia l ou ts ide  th e pr ote cti on  of t he  F ir s t  Amendmen t
is not  incomp at ible wit h ou r ea rlier  decisions .” Id. at 763.
32. Id . at 764.
In  N ew  Y ork v. Ferber ,30 t he  Cour t  addressed  how
dist ribu tion  of child pornograph y relat es to th e obscenity t est  in
Miller, a s  we ll  a s how  di st r ibut ion of child  porn ogra ph y sh ould
be tr ea te d u nd er  Fir st  Amen dm en t ju ris pr ud en ce. Ferber is
sign ifica n t  because t he Court  differen tiat es between  ch ild
pornogr a p h y a nd typical obscenity. The New York law at issue
in  Ferber cr im in a lized  the p rodu ct ion  and d istr ibu t ion  of
nonobscene child pornograph y, which was st ricter t ha n
requ ired  by federa l law. The Court  listed sever a l  reasons  why
stat es, an d pres um ably th e federa l government , had  a
compellin g interest in eliminating child pornography  and
th ere fore ha d m ore leewa y in crim ina lizing it .31
Fur ther , t he  Cour t  s t ressed how the child pornography test
differed  from the  Miller holding: “A t r i er  of fact  need  not  find
tha t  the ma te r ia l  appea l s t o th e pr ur ien t in te re st  of the  aver age
person ; it  i s not  r equ i red  tha t  sexua l conduct  por t rayed  be  done
so in  a  pa ten t ly offen sive m anner ; and t h e  m ate r ia l  a t  is sue
need  not  be conside re d a s a  wh ole.”32 Although t his t est s eems
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33. The Cou rt  st at ed t ha t “[a]s  wit h a ll leg isla tion  in  th i s s ensi t ive a rea , t he
con d u ct  to be pr oh ibi te d m us t b e a de qu at ely  de fin ed  by t he  ap pli cab le s ta te  [an d
pres um ably  federal] law, a s  w r itt en or  au th orit at ively const ru ed.” Id . Also, “[a]s with
obscenit y laws, criminal respons ibili ty m ay n ot b e im pose d wit hou t s ome  ele me nt  of
scienter  on th e pa rt  of the d efend an t.” Id . at  765. Alth o u gh  the Cou rt ’s opinion d id
no t decide th e issue d ecisively, Ju stice O’Connor’s concur rin g opinion a rgu ed th at  th is
new test does away with the t hird Miller  pron g of “ma ter ial wit h ser ious lite ra ry,
scie nt ific,
or  edu cation al va lue.” Id . at  774  (O’Conn or,  J ., con cur ri ng ). Sh e commented tha t  t he
s t a t e ma y ban  sexua lly explicit ma ter ials r egar dless  of th e va lu e s ociet y m ay  pla ce
on  th em. See id.  at  774-75 (O’Connor , J., concur rin g). Society’s in ter est in  any  such
mater ia l is irrelevant  “in protecting children from psychological, em otiona l, an d
menta l ha rm .” Id . at  775  (O’Conn or , J ., con cur ri ng ).
34. 394 U. S. 5 57 (1 969 ).
35. 495 U. S. 1 03 (1 990 ).
36. S ee S ta nl ey, 394 U.S. at 568.
37. S ee id . at 565-67.
38. 495 U. S. 1 03 (1 990 ).
broad, t he re ar e some basic limits: prohibit ed condu ct mu st be
adequa tely defined, and t her e mu st be some form of mens r ea
before criminal liability will be imposed.33
2. Possession un der St an ley v. Georgia  and Osbor ne v. Oh io
 S tanley v. Georgia3 4  and Osborne v. Ohio35 a l so show the
re la t ionsh ip and in ter act ion  between  obs cen it y ju r ispr ude nce
and child  p or nography  ju r i sp rudence . S tanley dea l t  wi th  an
individual pos se ss in g obs cen e m ater ia ls ; Osborne dea l t  wi th  an
individual posses sin g child por nogra ph ic ma ter ials . Again t he
Supreme Court  explained h ow child porn ograph y differs from
typ ical obscen ity.
In  S tanley,  the  Cour t  decided tha t  even  though  a  s t a t e or
federal  governmen t  can  cr im in a lize t he d is t r ibu t ion  and
pr oduct ion of obscen it y, on e h as a  cons t it u t iona l r i gh t  t o
possess it. 36 The Court  weighed th e sta te’s interest  in pr otectin g
it s ci t izens fr om the effects of obscen ity a gain st  th e ind ividua l’s
righ t  to v iew such  mate r ia l s in  t h e  pr i va cy of h is  or  her  home
and de ter min ed  tha t  th is  pr iva cy r igh t  wa s t oo grea t  for  the
sta te t o invade.37
However , th e Cour t r efused to exten d th e S tanley r u ling to
child pornography ju r isp rudence  in  Osborne.38 As in S tanley,
t he Cour t  in  Osborne weighed th e com p e t in g inter ests  at  issue.
The Osborne Cour t  concluded tha t  a  s t a te  has a  compell ing
interest  in pr otectin g it s ch ild ren  from the exploita tion inh eren t
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39. S ee Osborne, 495 U.S. at 108-11.
40. Id . at  109  (qu oti ng  Ne w Yor k v . F er ber , 45 8 U .S.  747 , 75 6-58  (198 2)).
41. Id . (qu oti ng  Ne w Yor k v . F er ber , 45 8 U .S.  747 , 75 6-58  (198 2)).
42. S ee als o S ta nl ey, 394 U.S. at 568 n.11 (“[W]e [do n ot] m ean  to express  any
opin ion  on stat utes m aking crimina l possession of other  types of pri nt ed,  film ed,  or
recorded ma ter ials. . . . I n su ch cas es, com pelli ng  reas ons  ma y exist for over ridin g t he
r igh t  of th e in div idu al  to p oss es s t ho se  ma te ri al s.” (em ph as is a dd ed )).
in  child p orn ogra ph y.39 Because  “‘sa fegua rd ing t he p hys ical an d
psych ologica l well-bein g of a min or’ is ‘compellin g,’”4 0
proh ibi t ing the  possess ion  of child pornography , even  in  the
pr ivacy of one ’s  home , “passes muster un der the First
Amendmen t .”41 Even  S tanley r ecognized tha t , i n some
situations, a  comp elling in ter es t  may over r ide on e’s r igh t  of
pr ivacy.42
The Miller/Ferber  and S tanley/ Osborne decisions are
sign ifica n t  for h ow they define th e relat ionship bet ween
obscenit y jurisprudence and child porn ograph y jurispr uden ce.
The t est s  in  Ferber  and Osborne show not  on ly  tha t  ch i ld
pornography is viewed in th e sam e genus  as  obscenit y, but also
tha t  the  demanding s tandard in  obscenit y jur ispr ud ence is
sometim es relaxed when child pornography is at issue. Despit e
the relaxed st an dar d, however, these cases sh ow t h a t  t he  same
jur i sp ruden t ia l prin ciples t h a t  apply t o obscenit y als o app ly to
child pornograp hy. The significance of this r elationsh ip will be
shown fur t h e r  in P ar t I V.C.2 becaus e pr inciples  from obscen ity
ju r i sp rudence will be used to sup port t he con s t it u t ion a lit y of a
belief or recklessness men s rea  sta nda rd for 18 U.S.C. § 2252.
B. Actus Reus  and  Mens  Rea  in  Child  
Pornogra ph y J uri sp ru dence
 Al though  the Cour t  has  demons t r a t ed  a  connect ion  between
obscenit y ju rispr uden ce and child porn ograph y jurispr uden ce,
th i s connect ion  dea l s p r imar ily with  t he  actus  r eus  of both
obscenit y and child pornography crimes. Additionally, Congress
has focused  on  en la rg ing  the actus  reus  of thes e cr imes with
severa l a m endment s to the child pornography statu tes.
Unders tand ing th e emph asis pla ced on defining t he a ctus r eus
element s r a the r t han  the mens r ea  st an dar d of child
pornography laws illustr at es th e significan ce of this Note’s
pr incipa l case , United S tates v. Maxwell.
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43. 513 U.S . 64 (19 94); see dis cus sion  infra  Par t IV.B.1.
44. In  response to th e Ferber decision , Con gr es s p as se d t he  Ch ild P rot ect ion  Act
of 1984, P ub. L. N o. 98-292, 98 Stat . 204-06 (1984), which amende d the  1977 Act by
e limina t ing the  obscen it y and  commercia l t ransact ion  requ irements  from the s ta tu te
as well as changing the d efinition  of a min or from  16 to 18 ye ar s old. S ee CPPA  of
1995, supra  note 1, at 24 (statemen t of Jeffrey J. Dupilka, Deputy Chief Posta l
In spe ctor  for Crim inal I nvestiga tions, U.S. Posta l Inspection Ser vice.). In 1986,
Congress passed th e Ch ild S exu al Ab us e a nd  Por nogr ap hy  Act of 19 86, P ub . L. N o.
99-628, 100 St at . 3510-11 (1986), a m endin g th e two pr evious a cts by “[b]annin g th e
pr odu ction  an d u se  of advert iseme nt s for child  porn ogra phy.” CPPA of 1995, supra
no te 1, at 25. In 1988, Congress en acted  th e Child P rote ction a nd Obs cenity
Enfo rcemen t Act, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Sta t. 4485-503 (1988), which  aga in
amen ded th e pr evio us  act s, b y ba nn in g t he  us e of computers  t o  t r ansmit  both
adve r t is emen t s an d vis ua l de pict ions  of child  por nog raph y. This act also prohibited
the bu yin g, s elli ng , a nd  te mp ora ry  cus tod y of ch i ld r e n  for th e produ ction of child
por n o gra phy.  See CPPA of 1995, supra  not e 1, a t 2 5. In  re spon se t o Osb orn e,
Congress en act ed t he  Ch ild P rot ect ion  Res tor at ion  an d P en al ti es  En ha nce me nt  Act
of 1990, P ub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4816-19 (1990), which prohibited the
poss ess ion  of child porn ogra phy. See CPPA of 1995, supra  no t e 1 , a t  25. Fin ally,
Congress passed t he Child P ornograph y Preven tion Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
110 Stat . 3009-26 to 3009-31 (1996), which ban ned th e use of computer s to create
child porn ogra phy. 
1. Actus reus and the evolution of child pornography laws
 Although  the Ferber  and Osborne decisions are  impor tan t  in
showing th e link  bet ween  obscenit y jur ispr ud ence a nd  child
pornography jur ispr ud ence, t heir  pr ima ry h oldings d ealt  with
defin ing the  a ct us r eu s of ch ild  por nogr aph y cr im es . Bot h
Ferber  and Osborne enlarged the actus reus of child
pornography la ws  by cr im in a liz in g t he a ct s of d is t r ibu t ion  and
posses sion  re gar dless of wheth er th e mat erial in ques tion was
legally  obscene. U nt il Unit ed  S ta tes  v.  X-C it em ent V id eo43 was
decided in  1994, t he Cour t  pr in cipa lly  de a lt  wit h  the a ctus reus
asp ect of child pornograph y jurispr uden ce.
Con gr es siona l focus  has  a lso been  on  b roaden ing the act us
reus of child pornograph y crimes. Congress has  amended  the
origina l 1977 Act five times, an d each  t ime  the amendmen t s
have focus ed on cr imi n a l act s a nd  not  me nt al cu lpa bilit y.44
None of th ese a men dm ent s, h owever, h as  dea lt s pecifically with
the  mens  r ea  of a  defendan t .
2. Mens rea and child pornography laws
 Alth ough  legisla t ive  focus  has been  sole ly on  de fin i n g t he
actus  reus  of ch i ld  pornography cr im es , t he S upr em e Cour t  has
D:\1998-2\FINAL\FEA-FIN.WPD Jan. 8, 2001
835] UNITED STATES v .  MAXWELL 845
45. S ee Ne w Yor k v . F er ber , 45 8 U .S.  747 , 76 5 (19 82).
46. S ee Os bor ne  v. O hi o, 49 5 U .S.  103 , 11 5 (19 90).
47. 513 U. S. 6 4 (19 94).
48. S ee id . at 78.
49. S ee id. at  68; see also Un i t ed  S ta t es  v . X-Ci t emen t Video, 982 F.2d 1285,
1289-90 (9th  Cir. 19 92), rev’d , 513  U.S . 64 (19 94); i n fra no t e 79 and  accompanying
text .
50. S ee 513 U.S. at 69-78.
51. S ee id. at 67-69.
brie fly considered mens rea sta ndar ds in child pornography
cases. In  Ferber ,  t he Cour t  ment ioned tha t  a t  lea st  som e le vel  of
men s r e a is needed in  order for a child pornogra phy st at ut e to
be cons t itu t iona l .45 La ter ,  in  Osborne, th e Cour t u ph eld an  Ohio
child pornograp hy st at ut e th at  ha d no express  men s rea
r equ i remen t , becau se a  defau lt s ta tu te w ould a pply a
“recklessness” standa rd.46 Because  the ma in focus of both cases
was on distr ibution a nd possess ion of child pornograph y, these
two case s s how t he limit ed  exa min a t ion  t h a t  th e Cour t ga ve
men s rea  in child porn ogra phy law.
F ina lly in  1994, the Court  decided United States  v . X-
Citement V ideo,47 which focused  on  the  mens r ea  r equ ir emen t  of
child  pornography l aws.  The  Cour t  ru led tha t  a  mens  r ea
s t anda rd of knowled ge must  be inferred from 18 U .S.C. § 225248
desp it e its pla i n  l anguage.49 The Cour t  held tha t  t he word
“knowin gly,” which  was  located in  a  d iffe ren t  pa r t  of the
sta tu te,  modi fied  bot h  th e “us e of a min or” and  “sexu ally
expl icit  conduct” elements. 50 Al though  the Cour t  he ld  tha t
“kn owledge” was  the r equ i red mens r ea  st anda rd for th e “use of
a  minor” element of § 2252, the issue in this case wa s whet her
th i s sta tu te wa s const itut ional an d not wh eth er “knowledge”
was the exclusive mens rea sta ndar d for child pornography
crimes.51 Th is  dist in ct ion  is cru cial because t his Note a dvocat es
a more relaxed mens rea standa rd.
In summ ary, Congress ha s focused on ly on  wha t  cons t it u t e s
t h e a ctu s reu s of child pornograph y crimes, ignoring th e men s
rea aspect. And, wh ile the S u p r eme  Cour t  has  given  some
at ten tion  to the mens rea sta ndar d, it  has focused pr imar ily  on
defin ing the act us  re us  st an da rd . Even  in X-Citement V ideo,
where the  Cour t  was  merely savin g § 2252 , ra the r  than
ar t i cu lat i n g the on ly a ccep table  men s r ea  st anda rd for  the
sta tu te,  the  Cour t  a t  l eas t  dea l t  wi th  the m e n ta l  in ten t
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52. S ee Un it ed  St at es  v. M ax we ll, 4 5 M. J . 40 6, 4 10 (C .A.A.F . 19 96).
53. S ee Un it ed  St at es  v. M ax we ll, 4 2 M. J . 56 8, 5 73 (A. F.  Cr im . App . 19 95).
54. S ee Maxw ell, 45 M.J. at 412.
55. Id . at 414.
56. S ee id .
57. S ee id .
58. Id . at  410. The Military Code makes 18 U.S.C. § 2252 applicable as a
c r imina l violat ion by t he F eder al Assim ilat ion Cr imes  Act. S ee 45 M.J. at  410.
requ i rement of child p orn ogra ph y law s. Given  th is h ist ory, t he
impor tance of United S tates v. Maxwell is  twofold. Fir st ,
Maxw ell represents a  new focus  on  the mens r ea  r equ ir emen t  of
child porn ogra ph y law s. Se cond, Maxw ell suppor t s  a  more
re laxe d mens r ea  st anda rd t h a n  the  “knowledge” s tandard
requ i red  in  X-Citement V ideo.
III. UN I T E D  S T A TE S  V . M A X W E L L
A. Th e Facts
 P r ior  to char ges bein g b r ou gh t  a ga i ns t  h im , Colon el
Maxw ell, a r espected officer with m ore th an  twen ty-five years
of service, was Comma nder  of Goodfellow Tech n ical Tr ain ing
Cent er  at Goodfellow Air Force Base in Texas.52 He  had
subscribed to Amer ica On -Line (AOL) before a ssu min g
comm a nd of th e base. 53 Pr oblems began for Maxwell when  a
conscien t iou s citizen  rep ort ed t ha t in dividu als  wer e tr ad ing
child porn ogra ph y via AOL.5 4 Subs equen tly, th e FBI
investigat ed Colonel Ma xwell, a mon g ot h ers, for susp ected
child pornography t r a ffi ck ing on  the  In t e rnet  and  seized the
sus pect mat erial. Once the FBI re a l ized  tha t  an  Ai r  Force
officer  was im plicated  in  th is inves tiga tion , it “cont act ed t he Air
Force Office of Specia l In vest iga tions (AFOSI) and tu rned over
a  copy of all th e seized ma t e rial.”55 After  re ceiving t he
in forma t ion  from th e FBI, th e vice-comma nder  of th e tr a ining
center  issued a  sear ch au th orization for Maxwell’s quart ers,
where his com p u t er was seized.56 A sea rch  of i t s ha rd  dr ive
found  th re e visu al im age s of child por nogr ap hy. 57
Maxw ell was  su bsequ ent ly cha rged with  violat ing 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252 for “knowin gly tr an spor tin g or re ceiving child
pornography in int e r st a t e  com m erce.”58 The i ssue on  appea l
focuse d on th e jury inst ru ction the m ilitar y judge gave. The
judge instructed the jury to find Maxwell guilt y if the y felt h e
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59. I d . at  424 (emph asis a dded). Th e milit ar y judge in str ucted  th e jur y t h a t
befor e it  coul d con vict  Max we ll of violatin g § 2252 th ey mu st find  “[t]ha t t he r eceiving
or  tra nsporting [of such depictions] was done knowingly: that is, tha t at  the t i m e t he
accused t ranspor ted  or  received the  visual depic t ions , he  .  . .  knew or believed  tha t
one  or  mor e o f t he p er son s de pi ct ed  we re m in or s.” Id . (al te ra ti on s in  or igin al ).
60. Id . By c la iming  tha t  “actua l knowledge” is n eed ed for  th e “us e of a m inor ”
e lemen t of § 2252 , th e de fen se r elie d on  X-Citement Vid eo’s  r a t iona le  tha t  t he word
“knowingly” mo difi es  bot h t he  “sex ua lly e xpl icit  con du ct” a nd  “us e of a  m inor”
e lemen t s of this s ta tu te. S ee Un ite d St at es v . X-Cit em en t Vid eo, 513 U.S. 64, 78
(199 4).
61. S ee Maxw ell, 45 M.J. at 424.
“kn ew or beli eved  t ha t  one  or  more  of the  pe rsons depicted were
minors,”59 wh ich  wa s d iffer en t  from X-Citement V ideo’s holding
tha t  one  must  “know” that  one of the performers involved in
sexu ally explicit  conduct  was  a child .
The defen se objecte d t o th e jur y ins tr uct ion, st at ing t ha t
“actua l knowledge of th e minorit y of th e act or s  is  an  essen t ia l
element  of an  offense un der  § 2252, n ot  som e s or t  of belie f or
su pposit ion.”60  Accordingly, t he d efense  a rgu ed , wh en  the cou r t
a llow ed  th e milit ar y jur y th e opport un ity t o find Ma xwell guilt y
of violatin g § 2252 simply because h e believed  a  per former  was
a  minor, it violated t he “clear” langua ge of the  st a tu te  and the
Su pr eme  Cour t’s in ter pr eta tion  of it.
B. The Cour t’s  Reason ing
 The Maxw ell cou r t  t ook  a  p ragmat ic approach  w it h  r ega rd
to b ot h  t he d efense ’s ob ject ion  and t he s cien ter  requ ir em en t  of
§ 2252. The mos t  impor tan t  i ssue for  the  cour t  was  whether  the
images  wer e child pornograph y. After t he court  was s at isfied
tha t  the prosecution’s exhibits pr ovided “am ple evidence” th at
minor s were in volved, it th en sh ifted its a tt ent ion to the m ens
r e a r equ i remen t .61 The Maxw ell cour t  r ecognized tha t  X-
Citement V ideo imposed a  m ens r ea  requir em en t  bot h  for  the
na tu re of the condu ct in volved and  for  the  age  of the
performer s. However, th e Maxw ell cour t  s t a ted  tha t
C on g r e s s  [d id  n ot ] i n te n d [] t o e r ect  a  v ir t u a ll y i n su p e r a bl e
b a r r i e r  t o  pr ose cut ion  by r equ iri n g t h at  a r ecip ien t or  a
dis tr ibu tor  of p or n og r a ph y  m u st  h a ve  k n ow le d ge  of t h e  a ct u a l
a g e of th e su bject , wh ich cou ld  only  be p rove d by  as cert ain ing
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62. Id . 
63. The cour t s eem s t o ne glect  Un ited  S tat es v. U ni ted  S tat es Dis tri ct Cou rt f or
the Central District  of California , 85 8 F .2d  534  (9t h C ir . 19 88),  where the  Nin th
Circuit  he ld tha t  under  § 2252  a  defenda nt  did  not  ha ve t o kn ow t he  act ua l ag es of
performers,  only t ha t t hey w ere  min ors. See id.  at 537-38. The Ninth Circuit’s holdin g
s e em s a more r easonable rea ding of § 2252 than th at of the Maxw ell cour t .
64. Maxw ell, 45 M.J. at  424.
65. S ee id. at 425 n .7.
66. S ee Un ited S ta tes v. Ce delle, 89 F .3d 181 (4th  Cir. 1996); Un ited S ta tes v.
Kimbrough , 69 F.3d 723 (5th Cir. 1995); United Stat es v. Bur ian ,  19  F .3d  188 (5th
Cir . 199 4).
67. Maxw ell, 45 M.J. at  425 n.7.
68. S ee id .
69. S ee id. (citing Kim brough , 69 F.3 d at  733). 
70. S ee id .
h is  ide n tit y a n d t h en  get tin g a  bir th  cer tifica te  or find in g
someone  who  kn ew h im  to  t e s t i fy  a s  t o  h i s  age .62
The cour t  then  rea son ed  tha t  since Congr es s d id  not  de si re s uch
an  “insu pera ble barr ier” of obt a in in g bi r th  cer t ifica tes  for  ea ch
per former ,63 once  the governmen t  had  proved  tha t  t h e images
were  child pornograph y, it “th en wa s only necessa r y to p rove
th at  ap pella nt  believed  [th e per forme rs ] were  min ors.”64
Odd ly, the court  did not support its u s e  of t h e belief
ins tr uct ion in the  t ex t  of t he  op in ion  bu t  r a the r i n a  footnote .65
Ther e, t he  cour t  bolster ed it s p ragmat ic approach  by concluding
tha t  Con gres s could n ot ha ve inten ded th e insu pera ble barr ier
of an  “a ct ua l knowledge” sta nda rd. Th e Maxw ell cour t ’s  main
suppor t  for  fi nding the  in s t ruct ion  va l id  h inged on  the  fact  t ha t ,
of the cases it  had found, 66 none  “dea lt  w it h  the va lid it y of the
pr oposition  tha t  a  bel ie f tha t  the a ctor  is  unde r  18 doe s n ot
comply wit h § 2252 (a)(2).”67 Cou pled  wit h  the a ss er t ion  tha t  no
cour t s ha d held t his jur y instr uction invalid, th e Maxw ell  cour t
th en  expla ined  th at  oth er cour ts  ha ve up held  l a n guage tha t
bot h  expr essly a nd  implicitly  suppor ted  a  more  relaxed mens
rea standa rd.68 These cases eith er  i nvolved expres s  ju ry
instr uct ion s us ing  a  “reck lessness” s t andard69 or situa tions in
which  the “kn owle dge” re qu ir em en t  wa s fu n ctionally sat isfied
by t he d efenda nt ’s con du ct .70
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71. This  Note  will concent ra te on  § 2252, w h ic h  prohibits distribution, receipt
and poss ess ion of im age s de pict ing  mi nor s in  sex ua lly ex plicit  cond u c t . S ee 18 U.S.C.
§ 225 2 (19 94). T he  sa me  ar gu me nt s ca n  also be ap plie d, h owev er , t o § 225 1, w hi ch
deals  with th e actual pr oduction and adver tis em en t of  su ch i ma ges , a nd  § 225 2A,
wh ich  was pattern ed after § 2252, and deals prima rily with  compute r  gene ra ted  and
a l t ered  ima ges th at  ar e ma de to r esem ble min ors en gaged in  sexua lly explicit
cond uct . S ee 18 U.S .C. § 2251 (1994); 18 U.S .C.A. § 2252A (West 19 94). 
72. S ee M a x w ell, 45 M.J . a t  42 4.  Th e c ou r t  ev en  ca ll ed  it  the “c rucia l fact .” Id .
73. Id .
74. S ee d iscuss ion  infra Par t IV.C.2.
75. S ee infra  notes 178-80.
 This  Pa rt  will argue t ha t a  “belief” or  “r ecklessness” mens
rea requ iremen t for 18 U.S.C. § 225271 is both  th eoret ically
justified and const i tu t iona l . Pa r t  A wil l examine the
weak ness es in Maxw ell’s ana lysis. Pa r t  B will exam ine th e
theore t ica l just ifications  for a m ore r elaxed  mens  r ea  s t anda rd
for  § 2252 which t he Maxw ell cour t  used  as  we ll  a s one
ju st ifica t ion  not mentioned i n  t h at case. Par t C will illustrat e
how th is  s ame  mens  r ea  s t anda rd  is  cons t it u t ional when  either
child pornograph y or non-child porn ograph y is involved.
A. Weaknesses  in  the U.S. v. Ma xwell Decision
 T h e principle quest ion the Maxw ell cour t  a sked was
whet her  or  n ot  the images in question involved minors.72
Because  th e cour t wa s “sat isfied” th at  th e govern men t  had
proven th e ima ges did  involve min ors, it  “th en w as  only
necessa ry to prove tha t [th e defend a nt ] bel ieved they were
minors.”73 Even  though  the cou r t  discu ss ed  the “kn owle dge or
belief” ins t ruct ion ,  t h e focus of th e Maxw ell cour t  was  whether
the a ctu s reu s of th e crime was  met . Therefore, one problem
with  Maxw ell i s tha t  i t  downplays mens r e a  a n a lysis in  child
pornography convictions.
This  Note contends that  mens rea sh ould be emphasized,
and that  in some limited insta nces a mens rea sta ndar d of
“belief” or  “reck lessness” cou ld  s u pport  a convict ion even
though no child  is a ctu ally p ort ra yed in  th e por nogr ap hy. 74 At  a
minimum, both m ens r ea a nd a ctus r eus sh ould be regar ded
with  the s ame le vel  of im por tance, a nd in  som e cases, men s rea
should t ake  precedence  due  to the  unique psych ologica l effe ct s
child pornograph y has  on pedophiles.75
Another  p rob lem in  Maxw ell is t he  cour t ’s  ju s t ifi ca t ion  for  a
more rela xed men s rea  sta nda rd. Although  footnote seven
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76. S ee Ega n, supra  note  14 (argu ing t ha t a  reckle ssn ess st an dar d would h ave
been a more appropriate sci en t er leve l th an  kn owledge); Bur ke, supra  note 14
(argu ing tha t  knowledge  is  t he only  ap pr opr ia te  me ns  re a s ta nd ar d for  § 225 2);
Matt hew S. Queler, Recent Development,  Th e Increased N eed for Stronger Anti-Child
Pornography St atutes in t he Wake of Un ited  Sta tes  v. X-Citeme nt  Video, Inc., 115
S.Ct. 464 (1994), 18 HARV. J.L.  & P U B . P OL’Y 929 (1995) ( argu ing  tha t  t he Cour t
shou ld ha ve a dopt ed a  st ri ct li ab ilit y st an da rd  for § 2252 l ike  the  Food,  Drug  and
Cosmet ic Act).
77. This  Note d oes not a rgu e th at  th e ma jority opin ion was bett er rea soned
than  th e diss ent . T h e  Co u r t’s opinion is  used  simp ly to show t ha t, u nder  its
r eason ing,  “belief” could be interpret ed as modifying “minor” in § 2252. Therefore, n o
me nt ion  will be made of the dissen t’s position or analysis in this N ote.
78. 513 U. S. 6 4 (19 94).
provided supp ort for its holding, th e Maxw ell cour t ’s  r eason ing
was as s t rong a s i t  could  have b een . F ir st , t he cou r t  could have
ar gued for  a  s t a tu tory in ter pret at ion in favor of the “belief”
stan dard; an d se cond, t he  cour t ’s  r el iance  on  p ragmat i sm and
preceden t -se t t ing exam ples could  ha ve been  mor e fully
developed. Th es e wea knes se s,  however , do not  dim in i sh  the
th eoret ica l justification of th e “belief” or “recklessn ess”
stan dard.
B. Th e “Belief” or “Recklessness” S tand ard is 
Th eoretically J ustified
1. S tatutory interpretation
 A k e y a p p r oa ch  the Maxw ell court  should ha ve used  to
jus t ify a m ore r elaxed mens r ea  st anda rd i s s t a tu tory
in te rpre t a tion . In laying out a  persu asive ar gumen t a s to why
“belief” or “recklessn ess” should be esta blished as  the mens r ea
s t anda rd for  the m in or it y el em en t  of § 2252, th i s Note  does  not
p romote or sp ecifically use one  st a tu tory  in te rpre t a t ion  theory
over an other , even though  the p roper  in terp re tat ion  of § 2252 is
open to academ ic debate.76 Ins tead , th is sect ion  wil l ou t l ine  the
Supreme Cour t ’s  rea son ing77 in Unit ed  S ta tes  v.  X-C it em ent
Vid eo7 8  to illustr at e th at  “belief” or “recklessn ess” can  be
in te rpre t ed int o 18 U.S .C. § 2252 bas ed solely on t he r eas oning
the Court used.
In  X-Citement V ideo,  the Sup r em e Court  addressed the
cons t it u t iona li t y of § 225 2(a ) and w het her  or  not  a  m ens r ea
requ i rement could be  const rued  rega rding t he “use  of min or”
element . Pr eviously, t he N int h  C ircu i t  had ru led  tha t  the
na tura l rea ding of 18 U.S.C. § 225 2(a )(1) a nd (2) did not r equ ire
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79. S ee Un ite d St at es v . X-Cit em en t Vid eo, 982 F .2d 1285, 1289-90 (9th  Cir.
199 2),  r ev ’d , 513  U. S. 6 4 (19 94).  T h e s t a tu tory  language  a t  is sue in  X-C item ent  Vi deo
is:
(a)  Any p er son  wh o—
(1) kn owingly tr an sport s or sh ips in in t erst ate or foreign commer ce by
any me an s in clu din g by  com pu te r o r m ai ls,  an y vis ua l de pict ion , if—
(A) the p r o du c ing  of su ch v isu al  de pict ion  in volv es  th e u se  of a
minor  en gag ing  in s exu all y exp licit  cond uct ; an d
(B) su ch v isu al  dep ict ion  is of s uch  cond uct ;
(2) knowingly receives, or distributes , any visual depiction that  has been
mailed, or  ha s b ee n s hi pp ed  or  tr an sp or te d in  in te rs ta te  or  for eign
commerce, or w hi ch con t a ins materials which have been mailed or so
shipped or tr an sport ed, by an y mea ns in cluding by comp ut er, or k nowingly
reproduces  an y visua l depiction for dist ribu tion in  int ers ta te or  foreign
comm er ce by a ny  me an s or  th ro ug h t he  ma ils , if—
(A) the pr oducing of such visual depiction involves the use of a
minor  en gag ing  in s exu all y exp licit  cond uct ; an d
(B) su ch v isu al  dep ict ion  is of s uch  cond uct .
18 U. S.C . § 22 52 (1 994 ).
80. S ee X-Ci tem ent  Vi deo , 982 F.2d at 1290-92.
81. S ee id. at 1292.
82. U.S. v. X-Ci te me nt  Vide o, 51 3 U .S.  64,  68 (1 994 ).
83. The Sup rem e Cour t expla ined, s ayin g:
If we were to conclude that  “knowingly” only modifies t h e  r e le v a nt ver bs in
§ 2252,  we  wou ld sweep  wi th in  the  ambi t  of  th e  s t a tu t e ac to r s who had  no
idea tha t th ey were even dea ling wit h  sex ua lly ex plicit  ma te ri al.  For
instan ce, a ret a i l d r uggist wh o ret ur ns a n u nin specte d roll of developed film
t o a  cus tom er  “know ing ly di st ri bu te s” a vi su al d epi ction  an d wou ld be
crimin ally liable if it were later  discovere d t ha t t he  visu al d epi ction
con ta ined images of children engaged in se xua lly explicit con duct . . . .
Simila rly,  a F ede ra l E xpr es s cou ri er  wh o de live rs  a b ox in  wh ich  th e
shipper  has dec l a r ed t he  cont en ts  to b e “film ” “know in gly t ra ns por ts ” such
film.
Id . at 69. For th e “absurd resu lts” statut ory canon, see Pu bli c Citizen v . Dep art m ent
of Ju stice, 491  U.S . 440 , 453 -55 (1 989 ) (st at in g t ha t t he  cour t s hou ld s ea rch  for o ther
evid en ce of congressional intent if a literal reading of the statu te wou ld “compel a n
odd re su lt”); United States v.  Turkette,  452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981) (stating that “absurd
a  defendan t  t o possess an y knowledge of either  th e performer s’
minor i ty s t a tus or  t he se xu a lly  exp lici t  condu ct .79 Because t he
First  Amendmen t  r equ ir e s some  leve l of mens  rea  regard ing
these two sta tu tory elements, 80 th e Nint h Circuit  held § 2252
uncons t itu t iona l .81 Under  the Nin th  Circu it’s rea sonin g,
“knowin gly” would  modify onl y t hose  ver bs  in  cla use s (a )(1) a nd
(2) an d would  not  modify th e min orit y or sexu ally explicit
conduct  elem ent s in  (a)(1)(A) an d (a)(2)(A) “becau se t he y ar e set
for th  in in dep en den t cla us es s epa ra te d by in te rr up tive
punctua t ion .”82 However, th e Su pr eme  Cour t conclud ed t his
int erp ret at ion would lead  to absu rd  r esu lt s83 th at  Congr ess d id
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r e su lt s a r e t o be avoided”); and Ch ur ch of  th e Hol y T rin ity  v. U ni ted  S ta tes ,  143 U.S.
457, 459 (1892) ( sta t ing tha t  a l though  an  absurd  resu lt  may  be with in  the  li t e ra l
mean ing of th e s ta tu te , su ch a  re su lt  ma y n ot h av e be en  in te nd ed ).
84. X-Cit emen t V ideo, 513 U.S. at 69.
85. Id . at 78.
86. Id . at 70.
87. 342 U.S. 246 (1952). The  Cour t a lso r elie d u pon  Staples v. United States,
511 U.S. 600, 619 (1994) (holdin g th at  “the ba ckgroun d ru le of the comm on law
favoring  mens  r ea  shou ld govern  interpr etat ion of §5861(d) [The Na tional Firea rms
Act]” r equ ir ing the  Governmen t to  show that  the de fendant  knew t hat  his AR-15
possessed features ma king it illegal under th e act) (empha sis i n o ri gin al ); Liparota
v. Un ited  S ta tes , 471 U.S. 419, 43 3 (1985) (holding th at  7 U.S .C.  §202 4(b)(1 ) ha s a
mens rea requ irement su ch that  the Government  “must  prove that th e defendant
knew  that  his acquisition or possession of food stamps  w a s  in  a  man ner u nau thorized
by st at ut e or  re gu la ti on s”); and United States v.  United Sta t es  G yp s u m  Co.,  438 U.S.
422, 423 (1978) (holding that “[a] defendant’s state of mind o r  in t e n t  is  an  e lemen t
of a cr im ina l an tit ru st  offens e” alt hou gh  th e Sh er ma n Act  does  not  refer t o int en t or
s t a t e of m in d w it h r ega rd  to t he  pr oscr ibe d con du ct).
88. S ee X-Ci tem ent  Vi deo ,  513  U.S .  a t 71 (citing Morisset te v. Unit ed Sta tes 342
U.S. 246 , 25 5 (19 52)).
not  int en d. To re me dy t his  abs ur d sit ua tion , th e Cour t  found
tha t  “som e for m of scienter  is to be implied in a criminal stat ute
even if not expressed, and tha t  a st at ut e is to be const ru ed
where fa ir ly p oss ibl e s o as t o avoid  su bs tan t ia l con st it u t ion a l
qu est ions.”84 The refore , to sa ve th e st at ut e an d a void any
cons t it u t iona l doubt s a bout  it, t he Cou rt  held  in X-Citement
Video th at  “th e t e r m  ‘k n owin gly’ in  § 2252 ext en ds  bot h  to the
sexu ally exp licit  na ture of t he m ater ia l a nd t o the a ge of t he
per forme rs .”85
In  ar guin g th at  “kn owingly” modifies “minor” in  § 2252,  the
Supreme Cour t s up port ed it s rea soning with three principles.
The first  pr inciple wa s t ha t cr imina l sta tu tes n eed to be
int erpr eted  “to include broadly  ap pl icable  sc ient er
requirements,  even wher e t he s t a tu te by it s t er ms d oes  not
con ta in them.”86 The second  pr inciple dea lt  wit h t he  legisla tive
h i story and congressional intent. The third principle was the
Cour t ’s desir e to a void constitut ional doubts whenever possible.
a. Mens rea and  Morissette v. United Stat es. To supp or t
the firs t  p r inciple, the Court relied on the landm ark case of
Morissette v. United States87 an d it s pr ogeny. Alth ough cr imin al
sta tu tes  requ i re a  mens r ea sta nda rd for th e essent ial elemen ts
of th e crime, public welfar e offenses  (e.g.  t r a ffic viola t ion s) a re
an  exception t o this r ule.88 The Court  foun d th at  § 2252 does
not  qua lify as  a public welfare offense primarily because
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89. Id .
90. Id . at  71-72 (quotin g Morissette, 342 U.S . at  255). 
91. Id . at 72.
92. S ee id . at 72.
93. Id .
94. S ee id .
95. Id . at 73.
96. S ee id .
97. 361 U. S. 1 47 (1 959 ).
“[p]ersons do not ha rbor set tled exp ect a t ions  tha t  t he  con ten t s
of ma gazin es a nd  film a r e gener ally su bject t o str ingen t p ublic
re gula tion .”89 Ra ther , t he  Cour t  found  tha t  th i s “s t a tu t e is  more
akin to the com mon-la w offense s a ga in st  the ‘sta te, t he p er son ,
pr oper ty,  or pu blic mor als ,’ t h a t  presu me a  scienter
requ i rement in  the a bs en ce of expre ss cont ra ry in te nt .”90
Addit iona lly, t he  fact  t ha t  “ha r sh  pena lt i es”91 loom  over  those
violatin g § 2252 ten ds t o indicat e th at  it  is not  a  pu blic wel fare
offense.92
Because  § 2252 does n ot  qua lify as a  public welfar e offense,
Morissette “inst ruct s  tha t  the pr esu mp tion  in  favor of a scienter
requ i rement shou ld apply to each  of t he  st a tu tory e lements  tha t
crim ina lize otherwise innocen t  conduct . ”93 The Cour t  found  tha t
the “use of a minor” element was one tha t determines gu i lt y
conduct  becau se n onobscene  ima ges of adu lts  engagin g in
sexu ally explicit conduct would receive First  Amendm ent
pr otection .94 Because  those  in volve d in  the p rodu ct ion  of
nonobscene adu lt  por nogr aph y wou ld  exp ect  to be  free  from
prosecu t ion , th e Cour t foun d t ha t “th e age of th e per former s is
t h e crucia l elem en t  sepa ra t in g lega l in nocen ce fr om wr ongfu l
conduct”95 an d th us r equired  some level of mens r ea.
b. Legislative history. The  legislative history behind the
passa ge of § 2252 was t he second factor  th e Sup rem e Cou r t
used  t o jus t ify  a  “knowledge” mens rea  st andard  in  X-Citement
Video. The Cour t  indicated that since § 2252 has evolved and
been am ended  over the  past  two decades, it is n ot clear whet her
“kn owingly” modifies t he s exua lly explicit n at ur e an d m inor ity
element s foun d in  cla use s 1 (A) an d 2 (A).96 Nevertheless, t he
Cou r t  a rgu ed  tha t  Con gr es s w as a t  lea st  kn owle dgea ble  of th e
Cour t ’s de cis ion  in S m ith v. California97 when  dra ft ing the
sta tu te.  S m ith  held t ha t a  sta tu te would violate th e F ir st
Amendment  if it omitt ed th e men s rea  requ iremen t  r e gard ing
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98. S ee id. at  149; see also X-Citem en t V id eo, 513 U.S. a t 73 (citin g 123 Cong.
Rec.  309 35 (1 977 )).
99. S ee X-Ci tem ent  Vi deo , 513 U.S. at 73 (citing Yates v. Unit ed Sta tes, 354
U.S. 298, 319 (1957 ), overruled by Bu rk s v.  Un it ed  St at es , 43 7 U .S.  1, 1 8 (19 78)).
100. S ee id . For  a b ri ef h ist ory of t he evolution of this sta tut e, see i d . at 74-77.
101. S ee Ega n, supra  note 14, at  1364.
102. Origin ally, § 2252 read as follows:
(a)  Any p er son  wh o—
(1) kn owingly t r an spor ts  or s hip s in  int er st at e or  fore ign  comm er ce or
mails, for th e pu rpos e of sale or  dist ribu tion  for sale , an y obscene visu al or
p r in t  me diu m,  if—
(A) th e produ cing of such visu al or pr in t medium involves the use
of a m inor  en gag ing  in s exu all y exp licit  cond uct ; an d
(B) su ch vi su al or  pr int  me diu m d epi cts  su ch con du ct; or
(2) kn owin gly r eceiv es for  th e p u rpose  of sa le or  dis tr ibu tion  for s ale , or
kn owingly sells or d istr ibut es for sa le, an y obscen e v isua l o r  pr in t  med ium
tha t  ha s be en  tr an spor te d or  sh ipp ed i n in te rs ta te  or for eign  comm er ce or
mailed, if—
(A) th e pr odu cing  of su ch vi su al or  pr i n t m edium involves the use
of a m inor  en gag ing  in s exu all y exp licit  cond uct ; an d
 (B) su ch v isu al  or p ri nt  me diu m d epi cts  su ch con du ct;
sha ll be p un ish ed a s pr ovide d in  su bse ction  (b) of th is s ect ion.
Pr ote ction  of Children Against Sexu al Exploitat ion Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-225,
§ 225 2(a )(1) & (2 ), 92  St at . 7,  7-8 (1 978 ) (em ph as is a dd ed ).
103. S ee X-C item ent  Vi deo , 513 U.S. at 74.
the obscenity of a par ticular  image. 98 Fur the r , in  X-Citement
Video, th e Cour t s tr esse d t ha t it  wou ld not  “impu te to Congress
an  in ten t  to pass legis la t ion  tha t  i s incons is tent  with  the
Cons tit ut ion,”99 even if Congres s did not h ave S m ith  i n  mind
wh en  pa ss in g t h is  leg is la t ion .
While  both t he legislative hist ory and  debat es seem t o be
opaque as to whether Congress intended “knowingly” to modify
the minor i ty  el emen t ,100 th e Cour t d id find  tw o th ings
per su as ive wit h r ega rd  to h avin g “kn owingly” modify “sexu ally
explicit  conduct . ”101 F ir s t , i t  a rgued  tha t  when  § 2252 was
origina lly ena cted, “obscene” modified “visu al or  pr int  medium”
in  cla use s (a )(1) a nd (a )(2).102 Ass umin g Con gr es s’ awaren es s of
the S m ith  case, “knowin gly” wa s t o modify “obscen e,” at t he
very least.103 However , in  ligh t  of Ferber  an d in a n effor t  t o
broaden  th e scope of § 2252, Congres s, in 1984, amen ded § 2252
by elimin a t in g “obscene” from  bot h  (a)(1) a nd (2). The Cour t
r e m a r ked tha t  wh en  § 225 2 was expande d t o it s fu ll
cons t it u t i ona l limits in  1984, Congres s never  expressly st at ed
tha t  by elimin at ing “obscene” from t he st at ut e it was  th ereby
also elimin at in g  the m ens r ea r equirem ent  th at  ha d been
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104. Id . at 74.
105. One of the am endm ent ’s par agr aph s re str icted a ny per son from  “knowingly
t r anspor t [ing or] ship[pin g an y] visual m edium  depictin g a  m i n or  e n gaged in  sexua lly
explicit  con du ct .” Id . at 75 (citing 123 CO N G. RE C . 33047 (197 7)).
106. S ee id .
107. Id . at 76 (quoting 123 C O N G. RE C . 330 50 (1 977 )).
108. S ee id . at 77.
imp licitly at ta ched to th e “ch a racte r  and con ten t  of the
ma te ria l.”104 Th us,  according t o the Cour t , “knowin gly” st ill
refers to the na tur e and content  of the ma terial at ha nd.
The Court ’s second legislative history a rgum ent  on  whether
“knowin gly” modifies the ch a r a cter  an d conte nt  of child
porn ogra ph y ma ter ials  is found  in  a  dia logu e bet ween  Se na tors
Pe rcy an d Roth. Dur ing th e de ba t es on t he or igina l child
pornography bil l, S en a tor  Rot h  had submi t ted  an  amendment 105
which  would add wh at  would ha ve been a pr ecursor t o § 2252 to
the bill reported by th e Sena t e  J u diciar y Comm ittee. 106 On  the
Sena te floor ,  Senator  Percy asked Sena tor  Roth  whether , under
th e a me nd me nt  (th e pr ecur sor of § 2252), a
dis tr ibu tor  or s elle r m u st  h a ve e ith er , firs t, a ct u a l k n owledge
t h a t  t h e m a t e r ia l s d o con t a in  chi ld p orn ogr ap h ic de pict ion s or ,
s e co n d , ci rcu m s t a n ce s m u s t  b e s u ch  t h a t  h e  [t h e  d is t r ib u t or ]
s h ou ld  h a v e h a d  s u ch  a ct u a l  knowledge , and  tha t  m ere
in a d ve r te n ce  or n egli gen ce w ou ld n ot a lon e  b e  e n o u gh  t o
re nd er  his  act ions  un law ful?
Senator Roth replied:
T h a t  is a bs olu te ly cor r e ct .  Th is  am endm ent ,  l imi ted  a s  i t  i s  by
t h e p h r a s e  “k n o w in g ly ,” i n s u r e s t h a t  on ly  th os e s elle r s a n d
d is t r ib u t or s  wh o are  consciously a nd  del ibera tely en gag e d in
t h e  m a r k i n g of ch ild  por n ogr a ph y . . . a re  su bje ct t o
pr ose cut ion  . . . .107
Bot h  the  h is tory behind t he 1984 am endm ent  to § 2252 and
the dia logu e bet ween  Se na tors R oth  and P er cy con vin ced  t he
Cou r t  t ha t th e legislative history persuasively suggests tha t
“k n owingly” modifies the sexua lly explicit conduct elemen t of
the stat ute. However, the Court  was less persua ded that  the
legisla t i ve his tor y an d floor deba te s in dicat ed t ha t “kn owingly”
likewise modi fied  the “min or” elemen t  in  t he  same
subsect ion .108 Ne ver thele ss , t he Cour t  rea son ed  tha t  since both
element s ar e th e sole la ngu age in  bot h  su bs ect ion s (a )(1)(A) and
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109. Id . at 77-78.
110. S ee id . at 78. The C ou r t  cited Osborne v. Ohio, 495  U.S . 103  (1990 ); N ew
York  v. F erber , 45 8 U .S.  747  (198 2); Haml ing v .  U n ited States, 41 8 U .S.  87 (1 974 );
and Sm ith v. California , 361  U.S . 147  (1959 ) to s up por t it s pos iti on.
111. X-Cit emen t V ideo, 513 U.S. at 78.
112. Id . (citin g Ed wa rd  J . DeB ar tolo C orp. v. F lori da Gulf Coast Bldg. & Const.
Trades  Cou nci l, 4 85 U .S.  568 , 57 5 (19 88)).
113. S ee Ega n, supra note 14,  a t  1376  (ar gu ing  th at  non e of t he  th re e r ea son s
the Cour t a rt iculat ed m an dat ed a  kn owledge m ens  rea ). 
114. S ee supra  no t e 110  and accompany ing  t ex t .
(2)(A), gram ma tically it would be “difficu l t  to conclude  tha t  the
word ‘kn owin gly’ modifies on e of t he element s .  . .  bu t  not  the
othe r .”109
c. Constitutional avoidan ce doctrin e. The a voidan ce of
cons t itu t iona l dou bt s w as t he t h ir d p r in cip le b y wh ich  t he
Supr eme Cour t, in  X-Ci tem ent V id eo, just ified us ing
“knowin gly” to modi fy “minor” in § 2 252. T he Cour t  reasoned
tha t  previous cases 110 had  sugges ted tha t  the absence  of a  mens
r e a re qu ire me nt  would  incu r “ser ious cons tit ut iona l doub ts .”111
Ther efore,  the Court must  interpr et a  s t a tu te in  a  way tha t
would  elimina te su ch doubts  “so lon g a s s uch  a  rea ding is  not
pla inly cont ra ry t o th e int en t of Congr ess .”112 Because  Congress
had in ten de d “knowle dge” to m odify  ke y elem en ts of t he
sta tu te,  the Cou r t  wou ld  not  be  ru lin g con t ra ry t o congr es siona l
in ten t  wh en  it  ext en de d “knowin gly” to both t he s exua lly
explicit  natu re and t he minority requirements in  subsect ions
(a)(1)(A) and (2 )(A).
A weakness in the Court’s reasoning is tha t  a lt hough  the
Morissette line of cases, the legislative history, and the
avoidance doctr ine all req uire some  level of men ta l culpa bilit y,
none of thes e th ree  rea sons  su ppor ts  th e idea  th at  only
“kn owledge” or “knowingly” should modify “minor” in § 2252.113
In  fact, a “belief” or “recklessn ess” mens r ea st an dar d ma y be
read into § 2252 based on th e sam e rea s on s  t he Cour t
ar ticu lat ed in  X -Citement V ideo.
d . “Belief” or “reck lessn ess” men s rea  and  the X-Citemen t
Video Court’s three argum ents. Precede nt  wa s t he basi s for  the
first  ar gumen t t he Su prem e Court  ma de to sup port a  men s rea
s t anda rd of “kn owledge.” The Court  relied on four  cases 114 t o
suppor t  its exten sion of “kn owingly” to modify th e sta t u tory
element s con t a i ned in  su bsect ions (1)(A) and  (2)(A). Althou gh
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115. Chr is t ina  Ega n  pr ovid es  a  good  ana ly sis  of h ow the w or d “k nowingly” was
applied in  the cases  ci t ed  in  X-C item ent  Vi deo :
The Court r elied on Mor issette v. Un ited Stat es and Lipar ota v. United
Stat es which both extended t he word “knowingly,” modifying only the verb s
in  the  s t atu te , to apply to the elemen t separ ating crimina l from innocent
cond uct . However , t he C ou r t  also relied on Staples v. United Sta tes wher e
the Court employed knowledge as t he app ropr iat e level of sciente r des pite
the fact  th at  th e s ta tu te  did  not  in clude  any  words  ind ica t ing mens  rea .
Thus, th e gene ra l ru le of these  cases d oes not d ire ct  t h e  Cour t  to app ly
wha t ever level of scient er is  pre sen t els ewh ere  in t he s ta tu te; r at her , th e
ru le in st ru cts  th e Cou rt  to p re su me  a s cien te r r equ ir em en t i n t he  ab se nce
of contrary congressional inten t.
Egan , supra note 14, at  1376 n.240.
116. S ee id . at 1376.
117. S ee S t aples v. United S tat es, 511 U.S. 600, 619 (1994) (“In short, we
conclude th at  th e ba ckgr oun d r ule  of th e com mon  law  favor ing  me ns  re a s hou ld
govern interpr etat ion of §5861(d) in this case.”); United St ates v. Unit ed Stat es
Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 434-447 (1978); Morissette v. Un ited Sta tes, 342 U.S. 246,
263-73 (1952). 
118. S ee Sta ples, 511 U.S. at 618-619:
[W]e  note only that  where, as h ere, dispensing with  mens  r ea  wou ld r equ ir e
the defe nd an t t o ha ve k now led ge on ly of t r adit iona lly lawfu l condu ct, a
seve r e p e n alty  is a  fur th er  fact or t en din g to s ug ges t t ha t C ongr ess  did  not
in t end to eliminate a  mens r ea req u i r em ent .  In  such  a  case , the  usua l
pr esu mp tion  tha t  a  defendant  m us t k now  th e fa cts  th at  ma ke  hi s con du ct
i ll ega l shou ld app ly.
Id .; see als o Lip ar ota  v. U ni te d S ta te s, 4 71 U .S.  419  (198 5):
To p rove tha t  pet itione r k ne w t ha t h is a cqu isit ion or  poss ess ion of food
stam ps wa s u na ut hor ized, for example, the  Governmen t need  not sh ow that
he had knowledge of specific regulations governing food sta m p  a cqu isit ion
or  possession . Nor m ust  th e Govern men t in tr oduce an y extr aord ina ry
evid en ce th at  would conclus ively dem on strat e petitioner’s state of mind.
Ra ther , as in  an y other  crim inal pr osecut ion r equ irin g men s re a, t he
Governmen t may prove by reference to facts and circumstan c es  s u rrounding
some of thes e ca se s e xplici t ly a dvocate requ iring “knowledge”115
a s th e ap pr opria te m ens  rea  st an da rd , to re ad  th is a s t he on ly
possible r u le ema na ting from t hese cases  is too restr ictive.116
The gener a l r u le i s t ha t  cr im in a l in ten t  must  be  pr es en t  for
each  element  of th e crime. The first  ques t ion  asked  by  the
Cour t  in t he se ca ses  wa s n ot “Does ‘kn owledge’ or ‘kn owingly’
ap ply to th e element s of th e crime?” but  ra th er  “Mus t t he a ct in
que st ion be const ru ed t o include  int e n t  as  an  elem ent ?” Only
after  an swerin g “yes” to th e second qu estion does th e Cour t  t ry
to deter mine a  necess a r y l evel of intent .117 Fu rt her mor e, in
some case s, t he Court  held that t he defendant  only needs to
know t h a t t he u nder lying activity he is pur suin g is prohibited
and not t ha t h e ha s “kn owledge” of each elemen t  of th e crime.118
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t he case  tha t  pe t it i one r  knew t ha t h is conduct  was u na ut horized  or illegal.
Id . at  434  (foot no te  om it te d).
119. S ee Un ited Stat es v. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. 64, 78  (1994) (citing
Edward J . De Ba rt olo Cor p. v . F lor ida  Gu lf Coast Bldg. an d Const r. Tr ades  Council,
485 U. S. 5 68,  575  (198 8)).
120. S ee Osb orn e v. O hio,  495 U .S. 1 03, 1 15 (19 90); see also discussion i n fra Par t
IV.B.3.
121. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 115.
122. S ee X-Citemen t Video, 513 U.S. at 73.
123. S ee id. at 77.
124. S ee id . at  77-78. 
Jus t  as in  the fir st  pr in cip le,  the a void ance d oct r in e d oes  not
manda te the  use of “knowingly” to m odi fy “minor” in § 2 252.
The a voidance doctr ine simp ly instr ucts t he Court  to inter pret
a  st a tu te s o tha t  it  avoid s s er iou s con st it u t ion a l doubts,  wi thou t
going “p la inly con t r a ry” to congress iona l  in ten t .119 Again, ther e
is no mention tha t “knowledge” is th e only accepta ble mens  rea
s t a n da rd th at  re moves  const itu tion al d oubt s wh ile st ayin g in
the gen er a l limit s of congr es siona l in ten t . In  fact , t he Cour t  has
already upheld a  “reck lessness” mens rea  st andard  in  Osborne
v. Ohio.120 In  Osborne, th e Cou r t  ind ica ted tha t  the
“recklessness” men s rea  sta nda rd “plainly sat isfies t he
requ i rement laid  down in  Ferber  th at  pr ohibit ions on ch ild
porn ogra ph y inclu de s ome ele me nt  of scient er .”121
Ther efore,  t he  Cour t ’s rea soning hin ges on the s econ d fa ctor
of legisla tive h ist ory, becau se t he fir st  an d t h ir d fa ct ors  do not
expr essly  stat e or require “knowledge” as the only mens r ea
stan dard. Al though  the Cour t  easi ly  found  tha t  “knowing ly”
modified a ll  el emen t s in su bsections (1)(A) and (2)(A) by
exam inin g th e legisla tive h ist ory, th is sa me a ppr oach could
have likewise found a more relaxed s ta nda rd of either
“recklessness” or “belief” to be l eg it imate . The Cour t
acknowledged th at  th e legisla tive h ist ory dea ling wit h t he
minor i ty element of the statut e was opaque at best .1 2 2  S ince
Congress had intended for  one  to know the characte r  and
cont ent  of th e ma ter ial at  issue a nd becau se th a t m odified  one
of the t wo el em en ts in  su bs ect ion  (1)(A) and  (2 )(A),  the  Cour t
found “as  a  ma t t er  of g rammar”123 that  “knowingly” should also
ap ply to the  minor i ty e lement .124 Us ing gr a m m a r  ru l es  t o
dete rmine the  men s  r ea  is  the s ame p roced ure for  wh ich  the
Cou r t  chide d bot h t he  Nin th  Circu it a nd  th e dis sen t, a s  t h ey
bot h  a rgued , in  X-Citement V ideo, t ha t  the “correct ” leve l of
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125. S ee Ega n, supra note 14, at 1377 (arguing th at t he 1984 Act after New Y ork
v. Ferber ma nife st ed C ongr ess ’ int en t t o pr ohib it ch ild p orn ogr ap hy  dis tr ibu tion  to t he
fullest  ext en t,  wh ich  a k no wle dge  me ns  re a s ta nd ar d w ou ld n ot a ccom pli sh ).
126. X-Cit emen t V ideo, 513 U.S. a t 75-76 (quot ing 123 CO N G. RE C . 330 50 (1 997 )).
127. Id .
128. S ee supra  no t e 44 and  accompanying t ext .
129. S ee Ega n, supra  note 14, at  1377.
mens rea d epended on wher e “knowingly” was located  in t he
sta tu te. 125
A bet ter  ap pr oach in  det erm inin g th e requ isite level of men s
rea for  the  m i nor i ty elem en t w ould b e t o look in  th e legisla tive
h i story for  an y specific me nt ion of men s r ea  an d t he  min orit y of
performers.  If n one a re fou nd,  the Cour t  sh ould  focus on  the
genera l in ten t  of the le gis la t ion  in st ea d of con cen t ra t in g on  a
hybr id ana lysi s of t extua l con text  an d  u n rela te d legis lat ive
h i story .
Congress’ genera l inten t  toward all the child pornography
sta tu tes  is to include s ome form  of men s r ea , even  th ough  th e
legisla tive  hist ory of th e or igina l s t a tu te and  it s  many
amendmen t s do not  ment ion  the  requ is it e  mens  rea  s t andard
for  “minor.” The Roth/Percy exchange is evidence of some level
of mens rea . The Sena tors discus sed th at  a dist ribut or ha s to be
“conscious ly” enga ged in  th e bu sines s a nd e it her  have “a ctua l
kn owledge” or “circumst an ces must  be such t ha t h e should  have
had  su ch a ctu al k nowled ge.”12 6  An  accused  may act  e ithe r
reck lessly  or m ere ly believe t ha t m at eria l he ha s is child
pornography an d st ill sat isfy th e re quir eme nt  laid  out  in t he
dia logue a bove th at  one “shou ld h ave  kn own.”127
Fu rt her , Congre ss cont inu ally amends  § 2252 in  an  effor t  to
en lar ge th e a ctu s r eu s t o th e fulles t e xte n t  poss ib le  under  the
Con st it u t ion  in  order  to e radica te  ch i ld  pornography from
society. 128 This  desir e to expa nd  th e crim ina l as pects  of child
pornography sugges t s  tha t  Congress  would want  the same
expa ns ive appr oach  ta ken  with t he m ens r ea r equirem ent .
Requ irin g “knowle dge” as t he m en s r ea  st anda rd for  the
minor i ty ele men t  fa lls  sh or t  of t h is  in t en t .129 A “recklessness” or
“belief” s t andard would sa tisfy  both  the  cons t itu t iona l
requ i rement to h ave  some  form of me ns  re a, w hile , at  th e same
t ime, pr ohibit ing ch ild por nogr ap hy t o the fullest ext ent
possible  as expressed  by the general intent of child pornography
leg is la t ion .
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130. This  ha s been  ar gued  by some  in a cadem ia. S ee Egan , supra note 76;
Que le r ,  supra note 76.
131. United  St at es  v. M ax we ll, 4 5 M. J . 40 6, 4 24 (C .A.A.F . 19 96).
This  Part  illustr ates seve ra l  th ings,  a ll  showing  tha t
s t a tu tory inter pret at ion provides the s t ronges t  cla im  for  a  more
re laxe d men s rea  sta nda rd a s it would r ead in to 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252 a “belief” or “r eckles sn ess ” re qu ire me nt . Fir st , th e
Supreme Cour t ’s  arguments  suppor t ing a  “k n owledge” men s
rea st anda rd for  the m in or it y elem en t  of § 225 2 ca n  a lso ju st ify
a  l ess  demanding s t a ndar d like “belief” or “recklessness.”130
Second, the  pr inciples  and  a rgument  tha t  th e  Cou r t u sed in
suppor t ing its  posit ion do n ot m an da te  th at  “kn owledge” is  the
only req uis ite m ens  rea  st an da rd  for child pornography crimes.
Third, eve n  if cou r t s a dop t  a  more relaxed mens rea sta ndar d
th rough s t a tu tory  in te rpre t a t ion , due to the conflicting
in terpre tat ions of § 2252, Congress sh ould am end  the s t a tu t e t o
a l low a “belief” or  “r eck le ssness” s t anda rd  in  order  t o resolve
the legal conflict a s well as br oaden t he crim ina l  scope of the
cu r ren t ch i ld  pornography s t a tu t e.
2. T he pr agm at ism  ar gu m ent
 T h e pr a g m a t is m  a r gu m e n t  is  ba s ed  on  a  fu n ct i on a l
approach  to jur ispr ud ence. Accord ing t o pragmat ism, the  r igh t
approach  i s one  tha t  actua l ly  works  and  not  one tha t depends
on form  or title. The Maxw ell cour t  i llust ra ted th i s approach  by
discus s in g the cor rect nes s of t he ju ry in st ruct ion . Th e cou r t
could not  believe t ha t, wh en p as sin g § 2252, Congre ss w ould
“erect  a virtually insu p er a ble barr ier to pr osecut ion by
req uir ing that  a recipient or a distributor of pornography must
have knowledge of th e act ual a ge of th e su bject.”131 The
a rgumen t ’s crux is  tha t  because  it  wou ld  be  im pos sible for  the
govern men t  to p rove tha t  one  “actua l ly  knew” the spe cific age  of
a  per former , as  a p ra ctical m at ter  one’s belief t ha t a  min or  is
involved is wh at  Congr ess  int en ded . Es sen tia lly, th e
“kn owledge” requ irem ent  is just a  form  which th e belief
s tandard functionally satisfies. Because th e belief standa rd
works, it  is therefore practical and should be adopted under
th i s t heory. Wh eth er or  not  th is is wh at  Congr ess in ten ded is
open to deba te, be cau se t he legis lat ive his tor y is spa rse on
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132. S ee d iscuss ion  supra  note s 96-109 an d accompa nyin g text .
133. The fact  tha t  o ther  cour t s  have used  the pragma t ic  approach  g ives  r is e  t o
a  pr eced en t a rg um en t.  Alt hou gh  th is i s t ru e, t hi s N ote  us es  th es e ca se s  t o i ll u st r a t e
how the pr agma tism a rgum ent work s with r egard t o 18 U.S.C. § 2252.
134. 896 F. 2d  271  (7t h C ir . 19 90).
135. 862 F. 2d  103 3 (3d  Cir . 19 88).
136. S ee Duncan , 896  F.2 d a t 2 72-74 ; Brow n, 862 F.2d at  1033-36.
137. Maxw ell, 45 M.J. at  424 n.7 (quoting Un ited Sta tes v. Dun can, 896 F.2d 271,
277 (7t h C ir . 19 90)).
138. S ee id . Some of the advert isements included “ ‘boys  an d gir ls in  sex  act ion’;
‘Youn g boys in s ex act ion fun ,’” with t itles  such  as “School Gir ls an d Boys,” “Lolita,”
“Loving Child ren ,” and “J oyboy.” Id. 
139. Id . (cit at ion  om it te d).
which  men s r ea  st anda rd s hould  app ly for  the “use  of a  m inor”
element  of § 2252.132
Oth er  cour t s  have  used a  p ragmat ic a rgumen t  both
expr essly  an d implicitly to just ify a m ore relaxed m ens  r ea
stan dard. 133 The Maxw ell cour t  ment ioned United States v.
Duncan134 and Un ited  S tat es v. Brown 135 i n i t s a t t empt  to
bolster  its pr agma tic appr oach. In both cases , the r espect ive
cour t s cla im ed  to rely  on an  “actu al kn owledge” men s rea
st anda rd for  the “use  of a  min or” elem en t  of § 2252 whe n, in  all
p ract i ca l it y , th ey us ed a  belief pa ra digm . In  b ot h  case s,  cust om
agen t s ma de con t rolled deliveries to the defend an ts a nd t hen
ar rest ed them m i nut es la te r, t he re by not  allowin g th e
defendan t s  t he oppor tun ity to fully inspect  and  “know” tha t  the
deliver ed it em s wer e in fa ct child  porn ogra ph y.136
In  Duncan, th e Seven th  Circu it  held  tha t  su fficie n t  evide nce
existed  to prove th at  th e defen da nt  ha d a ctu al “ ‘kn owledge . . .
tha t  th e photograp hs h e ha d ordered  were t o depict children
engaged  in s exu ally exp licit condu ct.’”137 The cour t  found  the
eviden ce suffi cien t  to show tha t  the defendan t  “knew” the
images  con t a ined child porn ograph y merely becaus e th e
de fen da nt  had r eli ed  on t he con ten t s of t he adver t isements  and
titles  whe n or der ing t he im ages.138 As the Maxw ell cour t
a r t iculated: “Sur e ly , com m on  e xp er i en ce  t ea ch e s t h a t
adver tisem en t s and t it les  of offer in gs  a re on ly evid en ce of a
belief in  wh a t  they s ay, n ot  actua l k nowle dge. Ye t  the cou r t  [in
United S tates v. Duncan] sa id  tha t  was  sufficien t  t o sa t is fy  the
st at ut ory r equ ire me nt  of knowled ge.”139
A sim ilar  sit ua t ion  occur red  in Brown. The re, t he T hir d
Circu it  found  tha t  the defenda nt ’s kn owing r eceipt  of child
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pornography “was proved by ‘his strong interes t  in  rece iv ing
child pornography  . . . an d his solicitation of child pornography
as expre sse d in  his  let te r a nd  oth er  corre spon den ce.’”140
F u r t h er , th e B r ow n  cou r t  s t a ted tha t  “[defendant ’s]
unders tand ing on  tha t  score  came from the  ca t a logue and,
based  on t he  cat a logue’s d escript ion .  . . , t he  jury was justified
in  concludin g th at  Brown  believed  it d epict ed m inor s en gaged
in  sexually explicit conduct.”1 4 1  Aga in ,  it  i s common sense tha t
when  one r ea ds t he  cover of somet hin g, t ha t  person  does  not
have “act ua l kn owledge” of ever yth ing or even  th e ke y th ings
with in  it. Because t he Brown  cour t  ru led th at  th e “kn owledge”
mens rea sta ndar d was met , it th ereby implied t ha t a  “belief”
men s rea  sta nda rd wa s legally valid for § 2252.
In  both cases, the  cour t s  were  sa t i sfi ed  tha t  the “kn owledge”
mens r ea  mod ify ing the  minor i ty ele men t  of § 2252 was fulfilled
by the defendant s’ be lie f. Ba se d on  ext er na l cir cumst ances , bot h
defendan t s believed t h a t  th e images t hey ha d received, or wer e
to receive, involved child porn ograph y. Obviously, neither
defendan t  really knew the images were child pornography
based  on  an  act u a l perception of the m ercha ndise, but  ra th er
th ey believed they were such based on advertisements. These
cases give  a  more p ragm at ic a pp roach to § 2252 by r ead ing in a
“belief” cr i te r ia  t ha t  wi ll  fu lfill the “knowledge” men s rea
stan dard.
P ragmat ism’s str ength  is its fun ctionality. Because a  belief
s t anda rd bett er  a ch ieves Congr ess’s overa ll goal of erad icat ing
child por nogr aph y, it  sh ould  be  adop ted . Likewise, w hen  cour t s
fun ctiona lly us e t he  defen da nt ’s belie f to sa tis fy th e kn owledge
mens r ea  st anda rd,  the  a rgum en t  fol lows tha t  t h is  more
relaxed s ta nda rd sh ould be incorpora ted in to th e sta tu te.
3. Exa m pl es of  relax ed  m ens rea s ta ndar ds in  fed era l ca ses
 Because  t h e  Su p r em e  Cou r t  h as n ot dir ectly held  t h a t
kn owledge  is th e only a ccepta ble m ent al culp abilit y for ch ild
pornography crim es, decision s in  th e feder al cour ts —includin g
the Supreme Court—can be used  t o supp ort a  more r elaxed
mens rea  requ iremen t. The Maxw ell de cis ion  en umer a ted  pr ior
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142. S ee Un it ed  St at es  v. M ax we ll, 4 5 M. J . 40 6, 4 24 n .7 (C .A.A.F . 19 96).
143. 495 U. S. 1 03 (1 990 ).
144. S ee id . at 115.
145. S ee i d .
146. S ee d iscuss ion  supra  Par t IV.B.1.
147. The Court defined pandering as “ ‘the business of pur veyi ng  te xtu al or
graphic mat ter  openly a dver tise d to a ppea l to th e er otic int ere st of th eir cu stom ers .’”
Id . at  467  (qu oti ng  Rot h v . U ni te d S ta te s, 3 54 U .S.  476 , 49 5-96  (195 7)).
148. 383 U. S. 4 63 (1 966 ).
149. S ee id . at 467.
de cis ion s142 t h a t  allow ed  a  more r ela xed  men s r ea  st anda rd for
§ 2252 to support its an alysis that  X-Citem en t V ideo’s use of
“kn owledge” to modify  the “use of a  min or” ele men t  is  not
exclusive, an d t her efore a lower  level of scienter  ma y be
allowable. Alth ough  Maxw ell did u se pe rs ua sive a ut hor ity, it
omi t t ed key ca se s t ha t  wou ld  have s upp or ted  it s a na lys is  more
per su as ively.
A key case not  ment ioned in  M a xw ell, but wh ich suggested
tha t  a  more  relaxed mens rea st andard  than  “knowledge” may
be constitut ional, is Osborne v. Ohio.1 4 3  While Osborne focused
pr ima rily on  the p r ivacy right versus th e compelling stat e
int erest  conflict, the Court also ruled that a “recklessness”
mens rea sta ndar d was applicable to that  stat e’s stat ute .1 44
Although th e mens  rea r equirem ent wa s not expressly wr i t t en
in to this stat ute, “recklessness” was app l ied pursuan t  to the
Oh io default sta tut e that  required at least “recklessness”
wher ever me ns  re a w as  nee ded  but  ha d n ot bee n exp r essly
stat ed.145 Because th e Court did n ot str ike down t h e  st a t u te  as
over br oad or unconstitut ional due to the “recklessness” m en s
rea, a m ore r ela xed men s r ea  requir em en t  than  knowle dge ca n
satisfy the ge ner a l r u le t ha t  a ll e lem en ts of s er iou s crime,
espe cially child pornograph y crimes, need an  inten t
r equ i remen t .146
Another  a rea  in  which  th e cou rt s ha ve implicitly sup ported
a  “belief” s t anda rd in  som e fa sh ion  is th e pan derin g doctr ine.147
The principal case discussing pandering is Ginzbu rg v. United
S tates.148 In  th is cas e, Ginzb ur g ha d sen t ou t cir cula rs
describing th e ma ter ial h e ha d for sa le. Some of th e ma ter ia ls
included ar ticles a bout  sexu al r elat ions t ha t h ad  ap pea red  in
professiona l journals a nd  a  repor t  of a  psychotherapi st  who
advocated  more leeway in sexual relations.149 Ginzburg also
offered a  handbook t ha t or igina lly ha d been  pu blish ed a nd  sold
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t o mem bers  of the m ed ica l an d psychiat ric profession before the
pu blicat ion r igh t s  were sold to h im.150 In fact, th is ha ndbook
had ostensible therapeutic value, and man y had found  the
ha ndbook helpful in t heir p rofessiona l pra ctice.151
Notwiths tand ing that  the ma terials had some ar tis tic or
scient ific value to them, the  Cour t  found  tha t  Ginzburg had
pan dered  th em  in a  sexu ally m otiva te d wa y. The Cour t h eld
t h a t  if the obscenity of th e ma ter ials is deba ta ble, then  t he
purveyor ’s em ph as is on t he  sexu ally p rovocat ive na tu re  of the
ma tt er  ma y be decisive in finding th em legally  obscene. 152 The
Cou r t  st a ted : “[Gin zbu rg] proclaimed its  obscenity; and we
cannot  conclude t ha t  th e cour t below erred in t akin g [his] own
evalu a t ion  a t  its  face valu e an d decla rin g th e book as  a wh ole
obscene  desp ite  the oth er  eviden ce.”153 Moreover , th e Cour t h eld
tha t  th ere  is n o Firs t Am end men t p roblem  in de ter min ing
whet her  t he  mate r ia l s a r e obscene wh en p roba tive va lue is
given to the fact th at t he items were pandered.154
To sum ma rize, whe n p orn ogra ph y is ad vert ised b as ed solely
on its  pr ur ien t a ppe al, in  deba ta ble sit ua tion s, s u ch  pander ing
may be probat ive in deter minin g legal obscenity . S ince
Ginzbu rg deals wit h obscenity, it  would a lso ap ply to child
pornography case s a s e xpla in ed  in  Par t  II .A. In  other  wor ds,
when  one believes or mak es other s believe tha t a n item  offered
for  sa le is child p orn ogra ph y, in r eas ona bly close s itua t ions , the
fact  th e ite m is  pa nd ere d sh ould be p roba tive a s t o whet her  it
will be cons ider ed ch ild por nogr ap hy.
Alth ough  the st ron gest  typ e of preceden t—a n on -point
ru l ing from the  Supreme  Cour t—is lackin g here, the “other case
examples” ar gum ent  is st ill per su as ive in suppor t  of a  more
re laxe d men s rea  sta nda rd for § 2252. Th e S upr em e Cour t
de cis ion s in Osborne and Ginzbu rg suppor t  a  m or e relaxed
mens rea  st andard . In  Osborn e, the Court explicitly held a
“recklessness” men s r ea s ta nd ar d const itu tion al, a nd  in
Ginzbu rg, the Cour t  la id  out  the p ande r in g doct r in e which
would  allow an individual to be prosecuted in  deba ta ble
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156. S ee supra  note 29.
s itua t ions mer ely  on h is  bel ief t ha t  the ma ter ials  he w as  sellin g
wer e obscen e or cont ain ed ch ild por nogr ap hy. 155
4. A su m m ar y of  al l a pp roa ches
 Each  of th e th ree a ppr oaches—pragm at ism, pr ecedent,  and
s t a tu tory inter pret at ion—provides just ification for a “belief” or
“recklessness” mens rea  sta nda rd for § 2252. However, together
th ey p rov ide a  compelling  a rgument  for  a l lowing  such  a
s t andar d. The pr imar y pur pose of th is Pa rt  is to offer th e
t heor et ica l justification for using a more relaxed mens r ea
s t anda rd for § 2252. Surely, a court  th at  uses t he m ore re laxed
s t anda rd sh ould exp lain  both  its  st at ut ory int erp ret at ion
app roach  as w ell  as i t s v iew  of how t he ju dicia ry should  act .
As mentioned before, the easiest wa y to m inim ize t his  legal
and acade m ic conflict is for Congr ess t o am end  § 2252 to r elax
the men s rea  sta nda rd. On e of t he  pr imary r easons  for  t h is  Pa r t
is to give  Con gr es s t he r a t ion a le a nd r ecor d by which  it could
jus t ify amendmen t  of t he  cu r ren t me n s r ea  s t andard—as
in te rpre t ed by the Supreme  Cour t in  X-Citement V ideo. With
th i s just ification , Congress  can  amend the  sta tu te  wi thou t
fallin g in to the s ame p roble m it  en counter ed  wit h  the or igina l
1977 child por nogra ph y st at ut e. Congr ess, in  th e 1977 sta tu te,
refused  to hold dis tr ibution of child porn ograph y to a lower
s t anda rd solely  on the m isgu ided  belie f tha t  the S upr em e Cour t
would  strike it  down as u ncons t itu t iona l .156 This m isguided
belief stemmed from Congress’ er r oneous  in te rpre ta t ion  of
exist ing case  law . This  Pa rt  sh ows Congr ess th at  “kn owledge”
is not  the  on ly men s rea  standa rd for child pornography crimes,
bu t a m ore relaxed st an dar d of “belief” or  “reck lessness” is also
th eoret ically justified. The next  section  will sh ow how t his  more
re laxe d me n s rea  st andard  wi thstands  both  common-law and
cons t itu t iona l  scru t iny.
C. Th e “Belief” or “R eck lessn ess” S ta ndar d  is  Con st it u ti onal
  This  Pa rt  will illust ra te how a “belief” or “recklessness”
mens rea  st anda rd s a t is fies  bot h  the com mon-la w t radi t ion  and
cons t itu t iona l requirements. Moreover, this Part  will a rgue
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tha t  a  new doct r in e s hould  be  de velope d in  chil d p or nography
jur i sp rudence to incorpora te a n a rea  not fully prohibited u nder
cur ren t Fir st  Amen dm ent  in t erp re tat ion : when  someone
believes he p osses ses  child p orn ogra phy bu t in a ctua lity does
not .157
T h e follow in g t able  sh ows  the cu r ren t  st a te of ch ild
pornograph y jurisprudence. The diagram illustr ates cases that
have deemed adequate a part icular mens r ea st andard  for  the
minor i ty ele men t  of § 225 2. C ase s w it hout  pa ren thes es  in dica te
those cases th at  specifically held th e me ns  rea  st an da rd  in
que st ion valid; cas es in  pa ren th eses  eith er  imp lied or s ta ted  in
dictum  that  the specific mens rea standa rd is or ma y be valid.
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158. “Receipt ” of ch ild pornograph y is also criminalized in 18 U.S.C. § 2252.
However , th is t ab le w ill u se  a s im ple  dich otom y of su pp ly a nd  dem an d. B eca us e
“rece ip t ” of child  por nogr ap hy  can  me an  eit he r “r eceip t” for l at er  dis tr ibu tion  or for
cu r ren t  possession, for purposes of this table, “receipt” is an alyzed u nder  eith er s upply
or  dem an d an alysis . S ee 18 U .S. C. § 2 252  (199 4).
159. 513 U. S. 6 4 (19 94).
160. This  section d eals w ith  porn ograp hic ma ter ials t ha t in volve a person un der
the age of eight een w ho is en gaged in  sexua lly explicit con duct . S ee 18 U.S.C.
§ 225 6(1),  (2) (19 94).
161. This  section d eals w ith  porn ograp hic ma ter ials t ha t a ppea r t o involve a
per son  un der a ge eight een, bu t wh o legally is an  adu lt.
162. 45 M.J . 406  (C.A.A.F . 199 6); see d iscuss ion  supra Par t III.
163. 69 F.3 d 72 3 (5t h C ir . 199 5); see d iscuss ion  supra Par t IV.B.3.
164. 383 U.S . 463  (1966 ); see d iscuss ion  supra Par t IV.B.3.
165. 495 U.S . 103  (1990 ); see dis cus sion  supra Par t IV.B.3.
166. 45 M.J . 406  (C.A.A.F . 199 6); see d iscuss ion  supra Par t III.
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T h is Pa rt ’s focus is whet her  th ose area s th at  use “belief” as a
mens rea  st andard can  survive  both  in  the common-law
tradi t ion and under  a  const i tu t ional  framework.
1. Belief and actual-child pornography
 The Belief/Actua l-Child  Por nogr ap hy cat egory is t he  easiest
in  which  to jus tify a  more  relaxed mens rea  sta nda rd for § 2252.
In  th is cat egory, t he individua l believes h e posse sses  child
pornography an d th e pornograp hy actu ally does involve minors.
D:\1998-2\FINAL\FEA-FIN.WPD Jan. 8, 2001
835] UNITED STATES v .  MAXWELL 869
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Und er  the  common  l aw, before on e is foun d gu ilty, t he
individual mu st s at isfy both  th e actu s reu s and m ens r ea
elemen t s of the  pa r t i cu la r  cr ime.  In  Morissette, t he Cour t
a r t icu l at ed t h a t  “[c]rim e, as  a compou nd  concept, gen era lly
cons t it u t ed only fr om concu r ren ce of a n  evil-mea nin g min d wit h
an  evil-doing h an d.”167 In  th is  ca tegor y, both  common-law
element s are sat isfied. First,  the individual satisfies th e actus
reus element when  he distr ibute s or p ossess es child
pornography . Second, t he ind ividual fulfills th e men s rea
requ i rement when  he believes the ma ter ial in  que st ion conta ins
child p orn ogra ph y.
Alon g with  fulfilling t he comm on-law r equ irem ent s, t his
ca tegor y is a lso cons tit ut iona l. The Cou rt  in Ferber  sta ted t wo
limit s to child pornograph y jurispr uden ce, despite th e lack of
pr otection  the  F ir s t  Amendment  offe r s  to th is  a r ea : fi r st ,  the
proscribed conduct must be adequat ely defined; and second,
the re must  be s ome elem en t  of me n s rea  be fore  cr imina l
res pons ibility  may be imposed.168 He re,  the  fi r st  cons t it u t iona l
bar rier  is met because th e statu te adequately defines that  t he
proscribed materia ls m us t cont ain  min ors en gaged  in s exua lly
explicit  conduct. Also, th e second constit ut ional bar rier is m et
because th e ind ividu al m us t “believe” or act  “re ckles sly” in
order to be p r osecut ed. Not ice aga in t ha t Ferber  does  not
req uir e one level of mens rea  over  another ; i t  jus t  r equ ires  tha t
an  in divid ua l h ave som e level  of men ta l cu lpabilit y. As
described  above , t he Beli ef/Act ua l Ch ild  Pornogr aph y ca tegor y
fulfills both th e comm on-law and  const itut ional requ iremen ts.
2. Bel ief  and  no-ch i ld  pornography
 T h e Belief/No-Child  Por nogr aphy cat egory poses  m or e
prob lems than  the  previous one. In  th is cat egory, t he  individual
believes he possesses child por nograph y, but a ll the per form ers
a re legally a du lt s . T h e ind ividua l’s belief t ha t t he m at eria ls in
que st ion con ta in  ch ild  por nogr aph y sa t is fies  bot h  the com mon-
law  re qu ire me nt  th at  th e ind ividu al p osses s a n “evil-mean ing
mind” an d th e con s t it u t iona l  limita t ion  tha t  the  cr ime con ta in
some level of mens  rea . This  cat egory is pr oblema tic pr ima rily
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169. S ee 18 U.S .C. § 2252 (1994). 
170. A mistak e of fact or ignorance argum ent is not a pplicable due to th e na tu re
of an  accu se d’s cond uct  in  chi ld p or nography scenario above. Typically, a defendant
is re liev ed o f cr imina l liability wh en a  mist ake  of fact pr ecludes  him  from posse ssin g
the culpable  m e n t a l int ent  req uir ed for t he cr ime. S ee 1 CH A R LE S E. TORCIA,
WHARTON ’S  CRIMINAL LAW  § 78 (15th ed . 1993). For exa mple, in  Mor iss ett e v. U ni ted
S ta tes , th e defend an t wa s found n ot guilt y of conver sion s in ce he  bel ieved  the  scrap
meta l had been  aband oned and t herefore did no t  possess the  requ i red menta l
cu lpab il it y neces sar y for “knowin gly” conver tin g it. S ee Morisse tt e v. Un ited States,
342 U.S. 246 (1952). However, in the child pornography situa tion, the individual
believes tha t  wha t  he posses ses  or  d is t r ibu tes  happens  to be im age s in volvin g m inor s
engaged  in sexually explicit conduct. In th is  situ at ion,  a m ist ak e of fact  is n ot a
defense since the individual would be guilty of anoth er offense “had the facts been
as he be lieved t hem  to be.” 1 TORCIA, supra , § 78 . Th e r ole of t he  mi st ak e of fa ct
defense is to ne gat e th e men s re a of an in dividual .  Since the  emphasi s  here  i s tha t
an  individual has t he requ isite ment al inten t, this defense is not a pplicable.
171. This  Not e wil l not  go in to th e di st in cti on b et wee n l ega l a nd  fact ua l
imposs ib il it y due to th e modern t rend of rejecting such a defense al l toget her . S ee 4
CH A R LE S E. TORCIA, WHARTON ’S  CRIMINAL LAW  § 697 (15th  ed. 1996); M O D E L P EN AL
CODE  § 5.0 1 cm t.  3 (Offi cia l Dr aft  an d Re vis ed  Com me nt s 1 985 ).
172. S ee MO D E L P ENAL CODE  § 5.01 cmt. 3(b) (Official Draft an d Revised
Comment s 198 5).
173. S ee id .
174. S ee 4 TORCIA, supra  note 171, § 699; see als o MO D E L P ENAL CODE  § 5.01 n.
89 (Officia l Dr aft  an d Re vis ed C omm en ts  198 5) (cit in g st at e cr imina l  s ta tu tes  tha t
ha ve eli mi na te d t he  im pos sib ilit y de fen se ).
for  two reasons. F ir st , if t he p ornogr aph ic m ater ia ls  doe s n ot
con ta in a  minor ,  then  the  ind iv idua l has  not  s a tis fied  the a ctus
reus un der t he com m on -law. Second, § 2252 requires the
mate r ia l in q u es t ion  to con ta in  vi sua l  depict ions  tha t  involve  a
minor  enga ging in  sexu ally exp lici t  condu ct  before s ubs ect ion s
(a)(1)(B), (a)(2)(B), (a)(3)(B)(ii), and (a)(4)(B)(ii) can  be
satisfied.169 I f no minor  i s dep icted  in  the pornography , an
individual tech nica lly cann ot be foun d crim ina lly liable un der
§ 2252.
 The major  cr i t ique170 of t h is  ca t egory is t he im possibilit y171
argument  or  defens e. The t hr ust  of th is ar gumen t is t ha t wh en
ma ter ials  ar e not child pornography no crime has been
com m i t ted despite t he ind ividual’s belief that  th ey are. 172
Implicit in  th is  a rgument  is  the idea  tha t , even  though  an
individual possesses  an  “evil mind ,” society is not h ar med wh en
no cr imina l act  i s commit t e d.173 However , th e mode rn  tr end  is
t o elimina te a ny impossibility defense for crimin a l
defendant s.174 For exam ple, one of the a ims of the Model P ena l
Code is to reject th e impossibility defense altogeth er except
when  ne ithe r  t he  actor  n or  h is  conduct  pose a  s er ious  th rea t  t o
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175. S ee MO D E L P ENAL CODE  § 5.01 cmt. 3(b) (Official Draft an d Revised
Comment s 198 5).
176. S ee 4 TORCIA, supra note  171, § 697 nn .79-87 (citing case wh ere in dividua ls
ha ve bee n fou nd  gu ilt y of comm itt ing  crim es t ha t w er e “imp ossible” t o commit due
to th e ind ividua ls ina bility t o sat isfy th e act us r eus  of the p ar ticula r cr ime). 
177. S ee People v. Siu, 271 P.2d 575 (Cal. Dist . Ct. App. 1954) (holding defendant
gu il t y of atte mpt ing t o violate n ar cotics laws a lth ough d e fe n d a n t  actually possessed
ta l cum powder which h e though t was h eroin); State v. Glover, 594 A.2d 1086 (Me.
1991) (holdin g th at  defenda nt  was p roper ly convicted for at tem pted  tr afficking in
na rcotics  even t hough  th e sub sta nce he  possess ed wa s bak ing s oda); People v.
Cu ll igan , 43 4 N .Y.S.2d 546 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980) (holding tha t a defend ant  may be
foun d guilty of attem pting t o sell narcotics when h e sold aspirin h e believed to be
coca in e); see als o 4 TORCIA, supra  note 171, § 699 n.95 (listing cases wher e
individu als  ha ve b ee n co nv ict ed  of cr im es  th at  we re  “imp oss ibl e” t o ac com pli sh ).
178. CPPA of 1995, supra  note 1 , at 3 6 (sta tem ent  of Victor Clin e, Em erit us
Pr ofess or  of P syc ho logy , U ni ver sit y of U ta h).
179. S ee id . at  37-41 (citing J U D I T H  RE ISM AN , SEXU ALLY E XPLICIT MEDIA /IM A GE S
(SEMI) A N D T H E  H U M A N  BRAIN  (1996) (statem ent of Dee J epson, P res ident , En ough
is Enough).
180. S ee id . at 115 (statement of Victor Cline, Emeritus Professor of Psychology,
Un ive r s ity of Utah). For an example of how child pornography engenders the
unde r ly ing path ology, see CPPA of 1995 supra no te  1, a t 3 5 (s t a t e m e nt  of Victor
Cline, E m er itu s P rofe ssor  of Ps ychol ogy, U niv er sit y of Ut ah ) (“In t he  cas e of
pedophiles, th e overwh elmin g ma jority, in  my clin ical exper ience, u se child
pornography and /o r  cr ea t e  i t  t o s t imu la t e and  whe t  t hei r  sexual appet ites which they
mas tu rbate to , t hen  la t e r  us e  a s  a  model for th eir own  sexua l actin g-out wit h
society. 175 Cour t s  have a lso convict ed  in divid ua ls  wh ose  condu ct
tech nica lly did  n ot  sat isfy the actu s reu s elemen t of a crime,
bu t who ha d th e requ isite men ta l inten t. 176  F or exam ple,
ind ividua ls have b een  conv ict ed  of dr u g-r elated  offenses when
th ey believed t h ey posses sed a  contr olled su bst an ce, when  in
actu ality t hey possessed  ta lc or some oth er  benign su bsta nce.177
Even  when  th e impossibility defense ha s been app lied, it
has bee n  du e t o the in nocuou s n a ture of t he ind ividua l’s
conduct . This is the not the case with child por n og r a phy . One
h a rm society su ffers is s pecifically from a n in dividu al’s belief
th at  th e images before him  ar e child pornograph y. Whether  the
per formers a re  actually minors is irrelevant in this regard,
because  to the  vi ewer  “they a re p er ceived  as m in ors t o the
psych e.”178 The har m  occurs when th e pedophile views these
pictur es becau se t he view ing che mica lly and  st ructu ra lly a lt e r s
the br a in , m akin g it  ea sier  not  on ly t o fan tas ize abou t  hav ing
sexua l relations with childre n  but  als o to become em otiona lly
and sexually aroused.179 The percept ion  tha t  ch i ld ren  a re
involved coupled  wit h  mast urba tory a ct ivi t ies  not  only cr ea t e s
the illnes s bu t a lso per pet ua tes  it. 180 Since t h e  a im  of child
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chi ldr en .”).
181. 383 U. S. 4 63 (1 966 ).
pornography laws is t o e limina te  ch i ld  pornography from
society,  Congress, by doing so, als o aids  in er ad icat ing t he
underlying illness which it engenders.
Even  th ough an  impossibility argu men t m ay not be ver y
pers ua sive, th ere  ar e inh ere nt  limit at ions t o prosecu tin g
someone based on  h i s belief th at  th e ima ges in  que st ion conta in
child pornograp h y. Notably, cases t ha t dea l with a  “belief” or
“recklessness” men s r ea  st anda rd a re ve ry limit ed , if n ot
nonexi st en t , when  no actua l  ch i ld  pornogr a phy is  in volve d.  For
examp le, if a performer  is pr epu bescen t a n in dividu al will  have
“kn owledge” tha t  a  min or  is  in volve d.  Alt er na t ive ly,  a  pe r son
will ha ve “kn owledge” th at  he does not posses s child
pornography whe n t he p erform ers  ar e not iceably a du lts  desp ite
th e fact s ome fem ale p erform ers  ma y ha ve th eir h air  in pigt ails
and carry dolls.
The typ ical sit ua tion  th at  will occur in  th e Belief/No-Child
Pornography cat egory involves  pe r former s w ho are e igh teen  or
n ineteen  but still  look young enough to be depicted as min or s.
Here, adu lt performers a re portrayed as pubescent teenagers.
Addit iona lly, one m ay r eas ona bly believe t ha t t he m at eria ls in
que st ion ar e child p orn ogra ph y  ba s ed  on  e xt e r n al
cir cum sta nces su ch a s a n a sk ing pr ice highe r t ha n r egula r
adu lt  pornography , a  purchase on  the  bl ack  market ,  or
adve r t is emen t s t ha t  indi ca t e m inor s a re  involved . The  next
Pa r t  will a na lyze in m ore d et ail h ow ad ult  porn ogra ph y ma y
cons t it u t ionally  be prohibited s olely on an in dividual’s “belief”
or  “reck lessness” tha t  the  mater ia ls  a re ch i ld  pornography .
a. S upply-side/ distribution . Alth ough  a r t i cu la ted  in  an
obscenit y setting, the pandering doctrine found in Ginzburg v.
United S tates181 wou ld  app ly t o those  si tua t ion s in  wh ich  one
believes or  lea ds  other s t o belie ve t ha t  the m ater ia l in  qu es t ion
actua l ly cons t itu tes ch ild pornograp hy. This doctrine can  be
app lied in child pornography jurispruden ce based on the close
re la t ionsh ip that  child pornogr ap hy s ha res  with  obscenit y law
as descr ibed in  Part  II .A. As expla ined  in Gin zbu rg, t he  fact
tha t  an  in divid ua l pande rs t he m ater ia l a s ch ild  por n ography
will be probat ive only if the visua l depictions are d ebat ably
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182. S ee d is cuss ion  supra  Par t IV.B.3.
183. S ee d is cuss ion  supra Pa rt  II.A.
184. S ee Ginzburg , 383  U.S . at  471; d iscu ssi on supra  Par t IV.B.3.
185. Ginzburg , 383 U .S. a t 4 67 (qu otin g Rot h  v . U n ited St ates , 354 U.S. 476,
495-96 (1957 ) (War re n, J ., con cur ri ng )); see dis cus sion  supra  Par t IV.B.3.
186. F o r exam ple, a clear ly impli cit manner would be to label the images as
involving fift ee n-yea r -ol ds . Alt hou gh  the w or ds  “ch il d” o r  “kid di e p or n” a re not used ,
it  is cl ear ly implicit that if the performers ar e fifteen, they are minors, and thus the
ma ter ials  ar e child por nogra phy.
187. S ee Ginzburg ,  383 U.S. at 466 (“We view the publications against a
background of commercial exploitation of erotica solely for the sa ke of their  pr u r i en t
app eal.” (footn ote  omi tt ed)); di scu ssi on supra  Par t IV.B.3.
child pornography .182 Mer ely pande r ing the  mater ia l a s  such
will not, by itself,  render the ma terial child pornography when ,
for exam ple, a ll per former s a re clea rly a du lts .
A mor e r ela xed s ta nd ar d for t he  pa nd er ing doct rin e would
be jus tified in  a child  porn ogra ph y set tin g.183 This  Note  will not
focus on this principle, but  will illust ra te h ow th e exist ing
pander ing doctr ine lim its  would a pply t o th e Belief/No-Child
Pornography ca tegory . F i r st ,  there  must  be a  deba table
conclu sion  tha t  t he mat e r ia l at  issu e conta ins  child
pornography .184 Thu s, visu al d epict i ons  of p repubescen t s and
matu re adu lt s w ould  not  qu a lify  unde r  th is  lim it a t ion  since
the re would be no deba table  is su e, on ly a  foregon e con clu sion
tha t  th e mater ia l wa s e it her  child  por nogr aph y or  not . Secon d,
t he mater ia l m ust  be  “open ly a dver t ised  to app ea l t o the er ot ic
interest  of their customers.”185 In t his case, th e “erotic interest
of th eir cust omers” would m ean  th at  th e ma t e r ia l  must  be
ad vert ised eith er e xpr essly or  in a  clear ly implicit 186 manner  as
child por nogr aph y. Thir d,  ther e n eeds  to be some for m of
commer cial t r ansa ct ion  since what  is  a t  is su e is  the “bu sines s of
pande rin g.”187 At  a  min imum,  the t r ansact ion  needs  to involve
an  excha nge  of mon ey; however , a comm ercia l tr an sa ction could
include qu id  p ro qu o t r ad es or ot her  forms  of bart er in
acqu ir ing child por nogra ph y. Althou gh t he d ist ribu tion  scena rio
un der  th e Belief/No-Child Porn ograph y category may n ot per  se
fulfill a ll t he r equir em en ts of com m on -law or  cons t itu t iona l
jurispr uden ce, an individua l sh ould in cur  crim ina l liabilit y
sim ply because the  images  a re pandered in  a  manner  tha t
re pr esen ts  th em  as  child p orn ogra ph y.
b. Dem an d-side/ pos session . As with  the  supply-side
scena rio of the  Belief/No-Child  Por nogr ap hy ca te gory, t he
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188. S ee d is cuss ion  supra  Par t II.A.2.
189. 495 U.S . 103  (1990 ); see d is cuss ion  supra Par t II.A.2.
190. 394 U.S . 557  (1969 ); see dis cus sion  supra Par t II.A.2.
191. S ee 394 U .S. 5 57; d iscu ssi on supra  Par t II.A.2.
192. S ee d iscuss ion  supra Pa rt s IV.B .3., I V.C.2. a.; see als o Ginzbu rg v. United
States,  383 U.S. 463  (1966) (elaborat ing t he pa nder ing doctr ine a nd it s  appl icat ion t o
obs cen it y). 
demand-side does not fulfill the a ctus r eus r equirem ent  un der
the common law . However , when  posses sion is concer ned , th is
scena rio is furt her limited in  comp ar ison t o th e su pply-
side /di st r ibu t ion  ca t agory . F ir s t , the  demand side  does n ot h ave
a  pan derin g-like doctrine t ha t would crimin alize certain  limited
conduct . Second, t he r ight  of privacy is a  decisive t ru mp  in t he
demand side  wh en  pos se ss ion  is  concerned.188 Al though  the
Cou r t  he ld  in  Osborne v. Ohio189 t ha t  t he govern men t’s
compellin g inter est t o protect children ou t weighs t he r igh t  of
pr ivacy to possess child porn og r a phy, in the dema nd-side
scena rio, t ech nica lly , n o child pornography is involved.
Therefore, wher e Osborne may be  cont rolling due t o the
ind ividua l’s belief t ha t h e poss ess es ch ild por nogr ap hy, S tan ley
v. Georgia190 app lie s s in ce t her e is  no actual child  pornography
involved. Under  S tanley, so lon g a s t he vi su a l dep ict ion s d o not
con ta in minors  engaging in  sexua lly explicit  condu ct, a n
ind ividua l is free to possess th e images even  if they ar e legally
obscene. 191
This  Note argues that t he court s should develop a
pander ing-l ike doct r in e t ha t  cr im in a lizes  the p oss es sion  of
deba ta ble child p orn ogra ph y even  th ough  S tanley tech nica lly
app lies wh en  an  in divid ua l possesses mate r ia l s tha t  do not
depict  minors. A reverse-pand ering doct rine is n eede d. J us t  a s
with  th e original pan derin g doctr ine, th is new doct r ine s hou ld
con ta in limit s t ha t w ould a pply t o the possess ion of mat eria ls
tha t  one believes to be child porn ograph y but t echn ically a re
not .
Sim ilar  to the or igina l pande r in g doct r in e, on e limit a t ion  on
the re ver se-pa nd er ing d oct rin e sh ould be t ha t t he im ages  in
que st ion mu st  deba ta bly conta in a  min or en gaged  in s exua lly
explicit  conduct .192 This doctr ine would  on ly cover  those
ma ter ials  involving a young adult portra yed as a pubescen t
t eenage r . Ima ges depicting prep ubescen t s or  t hose who a re
obviously a du lts  would  not  fall u nd er  th is cat egory.
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193. S ee Que ler, supra note 76, at  941.
194. While  i t  is  conce ivable tha t  t he r e  a r e some in dividua ls who become  sexua lly
stimu lated  by viewing child models in commer cial cata logues from Sear s or J CPen ney,
th is conduct could not be prosecuted u nder a  reverse-pander ing doctrine.
195. S ee supra no tes  4 , 6  and accompany ing  t ex t .
The ci r cums tances su r rou n ding the acquisition of these
que st iona ble mat erials would be the second limitation. These
ci rcumstances mus t  pu t  a  reasonab le  pe rson  on  n ot ice  tha t  the
ma ter ials  con ta in  ch i ld  pornography . F a ct ors to be consider ed
would  be t he p rice one p aid  for th e ima ges; th e ma nn er in
which  one obta in ed  the m ater ia l (for  exa mple, on  the b lack
ma rk et  r a the r  than  a t  a  drugstore ); how the images wer e
adver tised  or  marke ted ; and  wha t  the  t it l e and  ja cket cover
de pict .193 The key is n ot whet her  one i s s t im u lat ed by t he
mate r ia l in ques tion but  whet her  a  r eas ona ble per son wou ld
believe, under t he circumst a nces, th at  he w as  acqu irin g child
pornography .194
A third lim i tat ion is wheth er a  child would believe th at  th e
mate r ia l de pict s a  min or  en ga gin g in  se xu a lly  exp lici t  condu ct .
If a child could believe that  the ma terials at issu e depicted
minor s in s exua lly explicit con d u ct , it would be mu ch easier  to
seduce h im into commi t ting the  depict ed acts.195 Fundamenta l
to child por nogra ph y st at ut es is t he p rot ection of childr en  from
vict im iza t ion . Ped ophiles  an d child m oleste rs  us e child
pornography to seduce  ch i ld ren  in t o comm ittin g the d epicted
acts. If children  can believe tha t  th e ma ter ials at  issue in volve a
minor , a l though tech nica lly th ey migh t n ot be child
pornography , these mat erials ca n  ser ious ly  lower  the
in h ibi t ion s of children a nd expose t h e m  to possible  sexu al
exp loit a t ion .
V. CO N C L U S I O N
 Child  p or n og r a ph y  is  a  r a m p a nt crime that pr eys on  the
most vuln era ble of our  society: childr e n . I n  response to these
depr aved act ions,  Congr es s h as s ucces sfu lly  focuse d on
ad equ at ely definin g th e act us  reu s or cr imin al conduct  in  the
many sta tu tes a nd a men dmen ts p ass ed over the yea rs. Th e
impor tance of United S tates v. Maxwell is not  in  it s  ana lysi s bu t
ra th er  in th e issues  it r ais es. Maxw ell i s a  needed  s ta r t ing poin t
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in  re laxin g th e men s r ea  st an da rd  for 18 U .S.C. § 2252, a nd
th er eby a idin g in t he  er ad icat ion of child por nogr ap hy. 
A “belief” or “r eckles sn ess ” me ns  re a t ha t w ould m odify th e
minor i ty ele men t  of § 2252 is  th eoretically sound un der
p r a gm a t is m , pr eceden t, a n d  s t a t u tor y  i n te r pr e t a t ion
approaches. Moreover , if proper ly limit ed, t his  rela xed mens
rea sta nda rd is constit ut ional when  both  child p orn ogra ph y an d
non -child porn ogra ph y is involved . E i ther  Congress  or  the
cour t s sh ould t ak e init ia tive t o fir mly e st abli sh  th is  more
re laxe d mens r ea  st anda rd a t  lea st  for  18  U.S.C. § 2252, i f not
for a ll child porn ograph y crimes.
Chad  R. Fears
